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Coordinating Sanctions in Torts
Kyle D. Logue ∗
University of Michigan Law School

I. Introduction
Economic analysts of tort law have always been preoccupied
with the incentive effects of alternative tort liability and damage rules.
More precisely, economically oriented tort scholars have focused on the
question how to design a tort system that gives potential injurers and
potential victims the ex ante incentive to minimize the costs of accidents,
including the costs of preventing accidents as well as the administrative
costs of the regulatory regime. 1 Viewed this way, tort law is just another
regulatory tool, akin to Pigovian taxes or command-and-control
regulations, which policymakers can deploy to help manage the problem
of negative externalities. 2

∗

Wade H. McCree Jr. Collegiate Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law
School. The participants at the Duke Law School Legal Theory Workshop and the
University of Chicago Law and Economics Workshop provided helpful comments on
an earlier draft of this Article, for which I am grateful. I also appreciate the financial
support provided by the University of Michigan Law School’s Cook Fund.
1
The canonical formulation of the cost-minimization goal of tort law comes from
GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (170); see also
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAW (1987); STEVEN SHAVELL, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987);
A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW & ECONOMICS (2003).
2
Some economic analysts are famous for making the descriptive claim that the
common law of tort, like the rest of the common law, tends towards efficiency. R.
Poser, Economic Analysis of Law. This positive project has largely fallen out of favor
among scholars working in law schools, although some economists still pursue the
hypothesis. See, e.g., Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, The Evolution of Precedent
(NBER
working
paper,
2005),
available
on
line
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=687801. In this Article I do not
claim that the common law has a general tendency towards efficient outcomes,
although I do point out a few tort doctrines that are at least consistent with efficiency
norms.
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Viewing tort law as a system of deterrence or regulation is now
standard within the legal literature. This regulatory/deterrence
perspective has even been expanded to encompass non-legal forms of
social control. In recent years, legal scholars have come to view nonlegal social norms and informal non-monetary sanctions as an alternative
to formal legal rules when it comes to optimizing private incentives. 3
Under this regulatory account of social norms, just as a potential
injurer’s ex ante harm-avoidance incentives can be altered by the threat
of ex post tort liability or by Pigovian taxes, those same incentives can be
affected by the knowledge that the breach of a social norm may result in
a loss of valuable reputation in the community, perhaps accompanied or
anticipated by personal feelings of shame or guilt. This idea – that social
norms can regulate behavior, creating “order without law” – has been the
subject of considerable attention among legal scholars for many years. 4
Indeed, there are now competing theoretical accounts as to when social
norms will tend to be more or less efficient or welfare-maximizing than
formal legal rules. 5
The foregoing summary of the standard L&E deterrence/costinternalization framework will be familiar to most readers.6 What may
3

For recent scholarly attention to social norms, see Symposium, The Legal
Construction of Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577 (2000); Symposium, Social Norms, Social
Meaning, and the Economic Analysis of Law, 27 J. Legal Stud. 537 (1998); and
Symposium Law, Economics, & Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1643 (1996).
4
See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 Am. Soc. Rev. 55 (1963); ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).
5
Ellickson, supra note __ (emphasizing importance of close-knit groups and absence of
externalities to formation of efficient norms); Eric Posner, The Regulation of Groups:
The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev.
133 (1996) (); Steven Shavell, Law Versus Morality as Regulators of Conduct, 4 Am.
L. & Econ. Rev. 227 (2002); Paul Mahoney & Chris Sanchirico, Competing norms and
social evolution: Is the fittest norm efficient?, 149 U. Penn. L. Rev. 2027 (2001).
6
Some commentators draw a terminological distinction between “deterrence” and “cost
internalization.” See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 Colum. L. Rev.
1523 (1984). When policy makers can identify a standard of behavior that it regards as
socially desirable (presumably because the total social benefits exceed the social costs),
then those policy makers would simply seek to deter any behavior that diverges from
that standard. On this view, we might speak of tort law as deterring negligent behavior
or the criminal law deterring crime. However, when there is an activity that is known
to produce external social costs (but is not known necessarily to be socially undesirable
overall), then society may decide to internalize that external cost to the party engaging
in the activity and then allow that party to equate marginal benefit and marginal cost.
More often than not, this technical distinction between deterrence and cost-
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be surprising, however, is the relative lack of scholarly attention devoted
to figuring out how these various alternative, often overlapping, and
potentially conflicting systems of regulation are, or should be
coordinated, with each other. After all, if an external harm is being
internalized or deterred by one regulatory tool, it need not, and often
should not, be internalized or deterred again by another regulatory tool.
Take the quintessential example of a negative externality – some
activity that spews CO2 into the atmosphere thereby contributing to the
global problem of climate change. If a fully cost-internalizing Pigovian
tax (say, a carbon-based tax of the sort that many commentators have
recently proposed) were imposed on domestic companies by the U.S.
government, there obviously need not (and, from an efficiency
perspective, should not) be a state-level carbon-based tax on the same
polluters for the same carbon emissions. Nor should there be any
overlapping command-and-control regulations or any other sort of
regulation (including tort liability) designed to regulate the same
conduct. It – the external harm caused by CO2 emission – has, by
assumption, already been fully regulated.
Redundant regulation
represents unnecessary administrative costs and potentially excessive
deterrence. The same analysis can be applied to torts. Consider
automobile accidents or product-related injuries or medical malpractice
harms. All theoretically are potentially affected by the same problem of
overlapping, uncoordinated, and thus potentially redundant sanctions,
which means either over-deterrence or duplicative and therefore
excessive administrative costs, or both. Again, this is a subject that has
been largely neglected in the literature. 7
internalization gets ignored in the literature; and the terms get used synonymously. In
this Article, I use the terms interchangeably unless the context clearly calls for one or
the other.
7
There are some notable exceptions. Shavell has provided the most comprehensive and
systematic economic account of how to choose the optimal tool or combination of tools
for regulating risk; and my analysis, especially in Part __, will borrow from his. See,
e.g., SHAVELL, supra note __, at 277-90 (Ch. 12; “Liability versus Other Approaches to
the Control of Risk.”); and Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of
Safety, 13 J. Legal Stud. (1984). This Article differs in that it approaches the deterrence
question from a torts perspective in the sense already discussed: taking all non-tort
systems of regulation as given or fixed and imagining how tort law how tort law should
respond to the existence of alternative non-tort systems of risk regulation. In addition,
this article focuses on the problem of redundancy of overlapping regulatory regimes,
which is an emphasis found in none of the prior work on deterrence. As for the overlap
between legal and non-legal regimes of deterrence, Shavell, Polinksy, and Kaplow have
written on the optimal mix of monetary and non-monetary sanctions (see infra sources
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In theory, the problem of redundant regulation is just as
damaging to the goal of efficiency and social welfare maximization (or
cost minimization) as are the negative externalities that these regulatory
tools are designed to counter-act. This is why it just as important that a
carbon-based tax not be set too high as that it not be set too low – or not
enacted at all. How do we avoid the problem of redundant regulation?
Ideally, there would be some central, intra-jurisdictional policy planner
who would harmonize the various systems of deterrence, choosing the
particular system or combination of systems that is most efficient for the
purposes at hand. And this sort of centralized harmonization sometimes
happens. For example, when Congress enacts a given regulatory regime
it sometimes makes explicit the extent to which overlapping state law
regulations (including common law tort claims) are to be displaced or, to
use a narrower and more specialized term, preempted. Unfortunately, as
recent Supreme Court preemption decisions make clear, Congress often
fails (or declines) to be explicit about this displacement or pre-emption
question, thus leaving courts hearing tort cases to determine when
common tort actions been impliedly preempted and when not. 8
Similarly, when the alternative non-tort system of regulation is not a
federal regulatory law but something else (state regulatory law or even
social norms), the regulatory coordination decision is nevertheless left to

cited in notes ___). But again, they have not focused on the problem of redundant
sanctions. Also, within the literature on norms and law, there are the occasional
discussions of how one or the other system of social control gets called into action. For
example, in Ellickson’s elaborate taxonomy of the types of rules, types of sanctions,
and types of “controllers” (parties who either apply the rules or impose sanctions or
both), he discusses what he calls “controller-selecting rules,” which are rules (for
example, social norms) that govern whether or not, and under what conditions, parties
will resort to the formal legal system in the first place. See ELLICKSON, supra note __,
at 134-35. But Ellickson does not focus on the question addressed here: assuming the
existence of a tort system, and assuming that system has been invoked, how should a
court (one type of government controller) coordinate the existence of legal and nonlegal rules and sanctions? There has been some scholarship on the interplay between
custom and tort law, the most famous example of which is Richard Epstein’s article on
the T.J. Hooper case. See Richard A. Epstein, The Path to T.J. Hooper: The Theory
and History of Custom in the Law of Tort, 21 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1992) (arguing that in
general courts should defer to custom in negligence analyses). The present Article
provides a more general framework for understanding the role of custom in tort law,
again within the standard deterrence picture, and it argues for a different conclusion
than the one reached by Epstein. See infra text accompanying notes __.
8
See the discussion of the Supreme Court’s preemption rationale in Wyeth v. Levine
(USSC 2009) in Part IV below.
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the common law courts adjudicating tort claims applying traditional tort
doctrines.
In this Article, working from within this L&E deterrence
tradition, I sketch out a general framework for understanding how tort
law might be coordinated or harmonized with overlapping alternative
systems of deterrence or regulation. Again, the ideal solution would be
for a central policy maker to choose the optimal combination of
regulatory tools, using tort law when that regulatory tool is optimal but
substituting direct regulation or Pigovian taxes when those tools make
more sense – or various combinations of all three, depending on the
situation. 9 This Article takes a different approach. It works from the
perspective of tort law, taking all non-tort systems of regulation as given
or fixed. What does this mean? One way to think of it would be to
imagine a common law court that (a) is deciding a tort case, (b) must
take as given the existence of overlapping non-tort system of regulation,
(c) must (obviously) abide by any explicit legislative pronouncement on
how overlapping laws are to be coordinated, but (d) in the absence of
such explicit pronouncement wishes to apply a coordination principle
that optimizes ex ante incentives to minimize accident costs, including
(importantly) the administrative costs of the system. This version of the
tort-law perspective on the optimal regulation question focuses on the
individual court (probably appellate courts, but conceivably trial courts)
applying state common law principles of tort law, while simultaneously
(through common law coordination principles discussed below) taking
into account the wider regulatory world. And again, the overarching
Calabresian goal is that of minimizing the costs of accidents. The point
of this perspective is engage in a thought experiment to see how a tort
court seeking to minimize the cost of accidents should take into account
the existence overlapping regulatory regimes.
Alternatively, the tort-centric perspective could focus on the role
of legislatures (state or federal) in designing tort-reform legislation to
guide the decisions of tort courts in coordinating common law tort
principles with non-tort systems of regulation. Again, the idea would be
to hold non-tort regulatory regimes as fixed and then to see how tort law
should respond to the existing non-tort regulatory regime, assuming a
goal of welfare maximization and efficient accident-cost minimization. 10
9

This is essentially the approach of Shavell and others. See sources cited supra note 7.
One might complain that, if we are talking about a legislature (at least if we are
talking about Congress) choosing optimal tort/non-tort regulatory coordination rules,
10

http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art105

6

Logue:

6

This tort-centric approach in one sense embodies a combination of
policymaking ambition and modesty: It is ambitious in that it imagines
those who “make” tort law (judges or legislators) as trying to achieve
some version of accident-cost minimization and can choose among
versions of tort liability rules and damages measures to as to best achieve
that goal; it is modest in that it does not assume that all policy tools are
up for grabs, but rather that non-tort regulation must be accepted and
assumed to be an optimal within its domain.
Part II lays the groundwork for the Article’s analysis by
reviewing some of the basic principles and assumptions of economic tort
theory and regulatory theory. Part III then builds the basic framework
for how tort law should be coordinated or harmonized with various nontort systems of regulation. To build the framework, that Part uses the
example of a negligence-based tort regime overlapping with commandand-control agency-based regulation. Part IV then gives some flesh to
this framework by applying it to a particularly salient example of the
tort/regulation overlap problem: the example of federal preemption of
state products liability law. Rather than do an exhaustive review of the
preemption cases and literature (which would take us well beyond the
scope of this Article), this Part uses a few recent Supreme Court
preemption cases as a lens through which to view the broader questions
of institutional cooperation between common law courts and other
regulators. Part V then broadens the analysis by sketching out how the
analysis gets more complicated when other types of tort/non-tort overlap,
such as when Pigovian taxes overlap with strict liability. One of the Part
V also considers how the framework might apply when the non-tort
system of regulation is some type of social norm the breach of which
gives rise to informal (nonmonetary) sanctions. Part VI concludes.
II. Recap of a Few Principles (and Assumptions) of Tort (and
Regulatory) Theory
For some readers, it will be useful to review the highpoints of
economic theory of tort and regulatory theory. For others, this review
then it makes less sense to treat the non-tort regulatory regimes as fixed. And that is
why, as I talk about federal regulation below, I sometimes consider the possibility of
altering the non-tort regulatory regime. However, even when the tort lawmaker is
Congress, there will often be times when the non-tort regulatory regime is best
understood as fixed, either because that regime is politically difficult to change or
because it is optimal.
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will be unnecessary and maybe even a waste of time. The latter group (if
you know who you are) may want to skip to Part III.
The Rationality Assumption and the Exclusive Focus on
Efficiency
A key assumption underlying the economic analysis of law
generally and torts in particular is the view that individuals and firms for
the most part behave rationally, that the relevant parties can and do
weigh the costs and benefits of their actions and make choices that on
balance tend to maximize their own expected utility. As behavioral
researchers have exhaustively documented in recent years, and as many
others have suspected for decades before that, this rationality assumption
is often unrealistic. 11 Individuals frequently exhibit behavior that
diverges demonstrably and systematically from what has traditionally
been considered rational. Nevertheless, at least in areas in which the
regulated parties are likely to be knowledgeable and sophisticated (and
especially when they are subject to the evolutionary pressures of market
competition), the classical conception of rationality still seems a decent
starting point for analysis. Thus, for the remainder of the Article, I will
proceed as if optimizing ex ante incentives through tort law, as well as
through other forms of regulation, is both feasible, in the sense that the
relevant actors behave rationally, and desirable, in the sense that doing
so would tend to maximize social welfare. 12
One assumption that is standard in the economic analysis of torts
is that accident law should be concerned with providing compensation to
injured victims only insofar as doing so furthers the instrumental goal of
deterrence. There is no intrinsic value, on this view, in compensating
injured plaintiffs through the tort system. The standard justification for
this seemingly cold-hearted perspective is that compensation for harms
of all sorts, including harms caused by others’ torts, can almost always
be more efficiently and comprehensively provided through some form of
11

For a review of some of the most interesting findings of the behavioral turn in L&E,
see BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS (2000) (Sunstein, Cass R., ed.).
12
Most normative law-and-economics scholarship adopts, explicitly or implicitly, some
version of welfarism. I follow that approach in this Article, although I occasionally
address in welfarist terms considerations that some would regard as strictly
deontological or nonconsequentialist. For an extended development of a theory of
“weak welfarism” that combines welfare maximization with other non-welfarist
criteria, see MATTHEW ADLER & ERIC POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST BENEFIT
ANALYSIS (2006).
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private or public first-party insurance. 13 Under the L&E approach, then,
other than the deterrence function, there is no independent value of
having injurers pay damages to their victims.
This view rather famously conflicts with the corrective justice
account of tort law. According to corrective justice theorists, when an
individual wrongfully harms another (that is, she harms someone under
circumstances in which it was her duty not to harm that party), the
injurer then incurs an obligation to repair that harm; and tort litigation
provides a means of enforcing this obligation. 14 On the corrective
justice view, then, there is an intrinsic value to the “bilateral structure” of
tort litigation under which the victim seeks recovery from the injurer.
The idea is that justice requires that a party who wrongfully caused the
harm be the one to make the injured party whole. Furthermore, under
corrective justice, it is of no independent significance – indeed, it is
irrelevant – whether tort law does or does not create optimal ex ante
accident-avoidance incentives.
By contrast, under the economic
perspective, as mentioned above, there is nothing intrinsically important
about forcing a particular tort defendant to pay a particular victim a
particular amount. The bilateral structure of tort litigation, where the
victims sues the injurer for recovery, is merely instrumental to the goal
of optimizing ex ante accident-avoidance incentives. Thus, under the
economic approach, if overall social welfare were maximized (and costs
minimized) by having a system in which no direct compensation is paid
by injurer to victim (in which there are no tort claims), that would be
fine.

13

There is nothing inconsistent with using tort law to regulate behavior and having
injured victims seek compensation for their injuries in the first instance from their firstparty insurers (whether it is a private company or the government). Double recovery is
avoided, and causal responsibility properly assigned, through the interplay of the
subrogation doctrine and the collateral source rule. By paying for the tort victim’s
losses, the first-party insurer becomes “subrogated to” the tort victim’s claim against
any tortfeasors. The traditional collateral source rule, which forbids tort courts from
taking into account the tort victim’s payments from “collateral sources” such as
insurance, protects the first-party insurer’s subrogated tort claim against the injurer.
Subrogation clauses are usually found in first-party insurance contracts; however, even
if no contractual provision is present, the doctrine of equitable subrogation serves
largely the same function.
14
See, e.g., JULES COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992); ARTHER RIPSTEIN,
EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW (1998); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF
PRIVATE LAW (1995); Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 Iowa
L. Rev. 449 (1992).
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There is in fact an efficiency argument for adopting a regulatory
regime that makes injurers pay damages to their victims – an efficiency
story that explains the bilateral structure of tort law. Under such a
system, tort victims, who have important information about the nature
and extent of the harm caused to them, have an incentive come forward
and initiate the regulatory machinery. In that sense, the corrective justice
story and the deterrence story would point in the same direction. That
will not always be the case, however. And when there is divergence
between the efficiency and corrective justice, the policy maker – whether
it is a legislature or a court in a tort case – will have to choose which
vision of tort law to endorse. This point will be important below when
we examine the Supreme Court’s recent pronouncements on
coordinating tort law with federal safety regulation.
Choosing the Optimal Liability Rule: Negligence v. Strict Liability
According to the standard deterrence framework, there are two
basic issues in the design of an efficient tort regime: choosing the
optimal liability rule and choosing the optimal level of damages. 15 As to
the liability-rule question, the choice is generally between some version
of negligence and some version of strict liability. 16 The economic
advantages and disadvantages of a negligence rule have been
exhaustively rehearsed in the literature. Under a negligence rule, the
injurer is let completely off the hook for any of the harm that she causes
if she can show that she was not negligent, that she behaved reasonably,
that she took what the doctrine calls “due care.”17 And if we assume that
the court defines the due care standard at the efficient level (that is, that
courts get the negligence analysis right, from an efficiency perspective),
then the negligence rule, backed up by a sufficiently large sanction, will
induce potential injurers to behave efficiently in terms of care levels.
This is because potential injurers can avoid any responsibility for
whatever harm they might cause if they act with reasonably. Due care,
15

All of what follows in this section of Part II can be found in the systematic work of
Steven Shavell, Mitchell Polinsky, and Richard Posner. See supra sources cited in
note 1.
16
This is a vast oversimplification of the theoretical literature on liability rules, as there
are numerous other alternatives to straight negligence and strict liability, including most
obviously regimes that take into account in some way the behavior and potential fault
of the victim in causing the accident. But again, I am trying to avoid these
complications by focusing on situations in which only the injurer can affect the
probability or severity of the external harm.
17
Other elements of a tort claim, in addition to causation, include a showing that the
injurer owed a duty to avoid the harm that the victim sustained.
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in a sense, is a sort of universal safe harbor for avoiding tort liability.
So, as a simple illustration, if a potential injurer could spend $30 on risk
reduction and by so doing avoid any possible responsibility for the
$100,000 harm that her behavior might cause (with, say, a probability of
1 in 1000), then that care-level investment would look pretty attractive.
This is why, in the theoretical deterrence literature on torts, a negligence
rule is thought to optimize potential injurers’ ex ante “care levels.” This
is the L&E way of saying that negligence induces potential injurers to
take all cost-justified steps to avoid, or minimize the risk of, harm to
third parties.
That’s the upside of negligence. There are downsides as well.
One is that while negligence can optimize potential injurers’ care levels,
it also tends to produce excessive potential injurer activity levels. 18
What are “activity levels”? Think of it this way: With most risky
activities, there will always be some residual (not-cost-justifiablyavoidable) risk of harm, even if the potential injurer makes all optimal
investments in care. Driving a car, for example, entails a certain amount
of residual risk even if one observes all traffic laws and generally takes
all appropriate safety precautions. The same point could be made about
medical treatments or consumer products or prescription drugs or most
anything that can cause harm. The problem is that, for any such activity,
if the potential injurer complies with the negligence standard, she
thereafter does not bear (and hence, under traditional theory, she will
externalize) the cost of third-party harms that occur as a result of the
residual risk inherent in the activity. Under a negligence regime, in other
words, this risk of unpreventable harms is externalized to the third-party
victim, causing an efficiency problem. 19
Hence, if a product
manufacturer satisfies the risk-benefit product-defect test, it can safely
ignore the possibility of harms caused by its products. 20 The resulting
excessive injurer activity levels are, again, a sort of negative externality.

18

For the original and still authoritative analysis of the care-level/activity-level
distinction, see Steven Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence, 9 J. Leg. Stud. 1
(1980).
19
For a recent discussion of how negligence law tries to sort out unpreventable harms
from preventable harms (or harms caused by negligence), see Grady, Mark F.,
Unavoidable Accident (January 1, 2009), UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research
Paper No. 09-01. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1337288.
20
Most versions of the “design defect” doctrine in products liability law approximate a
negligence standard. Cases involving “manufacturing defects” come closer to strict
liability.
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This negative externality is in theory corrected by strict liability.
Strict liability, from the perspective of the injurer, can be understood as a
type of Pigovian tax that is implemented by a court (rather than by an
agency) after an injury occurs and after suit is brought by the injured
victim. As with other Pigovian taxes, however, it has the effect of
internalizing external harms. Under strict liability, the potential injurer is
not only induced to take optimal care, since doing so will reduce the size
of her ex post liability, but also is encouraged to engage in the activity
only if the benefits exceed the full social costs, including the costs of the
tax. This is because the residual risk is shifted from the potential victims
to the potential injurers. 21
Another drawback of negligence is the amount of information
that it requires of courts. To do the analysis properly, the court must
have an enormous amount of data, considerably more than is required to
do strict liability. To apply a strict liability rule, the court need only
determine the amount of the harm actually caused to the victim by the
injurer. To apply the negligence standard, by contrast, the court must not
only do the causation and damages analysis, but must also have
information about the cost of the precaution to injurer (that is, it must be
able to calculate the “B” in Learned Hand’s famous “BPL” negligence
test), as well as information about the precise effect of the safety
investments on the expected harm to third parties (“PL”). 22 And if the
precaution reduces the benefit of the activity itself to the potential
21

Just as negligence has a problem dealing with injurer activity levels, strict liability
has a problem optimizing victim activity levels, and for the same reason: If injurers are
strict liability for harms, there is no reason for victims to take care; and this problem
remains even if a contributory negligence defense is introduced to the strict liability
rule, which would induce victims to take due care but not to optimize activity levels. In
sum, the standard conclusion in the literature then is this: A negligence rule (or a rule
of negligence with contributory negligence) optimizes injurer and victim care levels
and victim activity levels, but not injurer activity levels. And strict liability (with a
defense of contributory negligence) optimizes both sides’ care levels and injurer
activity levels, but not victim activity levels. Shavell. In this Article, for simplicity I
ignore victim care levels.
22
United States v. Carroll Towing Co. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). In that case, Judge
Learned Hand introduced the “BPL” formula that became synonymous with the
economic approach to negligence law. In that formula, “B” is the burden or cost of the
precaution that the injurer in the case failed to take; “P” is the ex ante probability of that
particular type of loss occurring; “L” is the loss itself, such that PL is the reduction in
expected harm that would have occurred had the injurer invested ex ante in B. Thus,
under the Learned Hand test, the injurer will be deemed negligent (or will be found to
have taken less than due care) when B < PL. See Posner, supra note __.
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injurer, that fact has to be taken into account as well, as part of the cost
of precaution. This is a lot of information to expect a court to acquire
and process accurately.
Despite the relative simplicity of the strict liability analysis, it is
sometimes said that negligence may have lower administrative costs than
strict liability, for two different reasons. First, under a negligence
standard, although each case may be relatively costly to administer
(because of the higher information burden associated with the BPL
analysis), there should be fewer actual trials than with strict liability, as
any cases involving clear compliance with the negligence standard (clear
absence of fault on the part of the injurer) will not be brought at all.
Under the strict liability standard, by contrast, the injured victim need
not show fault and therefore will have an incentive to bring a suit
whenever he believes he can demonstrate that the injurer caused his
harm (and when the likely damage award exceeds the victim’s costs of
litigation). Thus, the question is whether the higher-administrative-costper-case effect of negligence is overwhelmed by the larger-number-ofcases effect of strict liability. 23
Optimal Damages
In addition to choosing the optimal liability rule, the designer of
an efficient tort regime must choose the optimal level of damages. In
general, the conventional wisdom is that sanctions equal to the harm
caused will generally produce efficient ex ante risk-reduction incentives.
In the case of a negligence rule, a threatened sanction equal to the harm
caused will usually be enough (sometimes more than enough) to induce
ex ante compliance with the efficient due care standard, as the potential
injurers will happily spend a little on precautions ex ante to get the large
benefit of freedom from all damage liability. (As in the example above,
the $30 investment eliminates a cost with an expected value of $100. A
no-brainer for the potential injurer.) The optimal sanction under a
negligence regime, however, need not necessarily be exactly equal to the
harm caused; it can be higher or lower, just so long as that sanction is
enough to induce compliance with the efficient standard of care. Indeed,
the threatened sanction can be almost infinite, so long as due care is

23

SHAVELL, supra note __, at 264 (“Although the volume of claims should be greater
under strict liability, the average administrative cost per claim should be higher under
the negligence rule.”).
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sufficient to eliminate all liability and there is no risk of judicial error
and no risk aversion. 24
Under strict liability, it is important that damages be set at the
amount of the harm caused, or set so that the expected value of the
sanction experienced by the potential injurer is equal to the expected
value of the external harm. In some cases this means the sanction should
equal the harm. That assumes, however, that the likelihood that the
sanction will in fact be imposed is one-hundred percent in the event of
the harm. That is, the sanction should equal the harm when there is no
possibility that the harm will go undetected and thus unsanctioned. Of
course, if there is some possibility that the harm will go undetected, then
the sanction imposed on the injurer will need to be increased so that the
expected value of the sanction is equal to the expected value of the
external harm. 25 If the damages under strict liability are set too low (so
that their expected value is less than the expected value of the external
harm), then potential injurer activity levels will be too high, as the
external costs will not be fully internalized. If the strict liability sanction
is set too high, there will be over-deterrence and the potential injurer
activity levels will be too low. Both are inefficient outcomes.
Tort Law vs. Agency-Based Ex Ante Regulation
Because tort law can be viewed as a form of regulation, it can
therefore be compared and contrasted with other forms of regulation.
For example, tort law is sometimes characterized as an ex post system of
regulation, in the sense that the tort system is called into action only after
some harm occurs. 26 By contrast, most regulation, or what the average
lay person would call regulation, takes place ex ante, before the harm
occurs. The quintessential form of ex ante regulation is agency-based
command-and-control regulation. Under classic command-and-control
regulation, the regulating agency instructs the regulated parties precisely
what risk-reducing steps must be taken for the parties to be allowed to
24

The sanction in some cases could be lower than full damages and still induce optimal
care. In the example in the text, any damages over $30,000 would be sufficient to do
that.
25
The standard way of dealing with a less than certain sanction is to add a kicker,
enough to make the expected value of the sanction equal to the expected harm from the
activity. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol.
Econ. 169 (1968); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff
Between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 Am. Econ. Review. 880 (1979).
26
Shavell, supra note __.
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engage in the activity in question. Examples of command-and-control
regulation include various types of environmental rules, the regulation of
automobile design safety, as well as the regulation of medical technology
(including drugs and medical devices).
Command-and-control
regulation in the U.S. often entails the participation by the regulated
parties in the process of administrative rulemaking and thus in the design
and selection of particular regulations. Ultimately, however, it is the
regulatory authority (legislature or agency) who must decide ex ante
(again, before the harm occurs) what activities will be permitted and
what safety precautions will be taken to minimize harms.
Another type of ex ante regulation is a Pigovian tax. The
paradigmatic Pigovian tax is imposed up front: when the risky or harmcausing activity is engaged in but before the harm associated with the
activity is fully realized. One example is the economists’ preferred
solution to global warming: the carbon-based tax. 27 Such a tax would in
theory be collected at the point of production (or, somewhat less
efficiently, at the point of sale to consumers), but in any event – with
almost every proposal for a carbon tax I have seen – the tax would be
collected before the actual harm to the environment takes place. 28 The
amount of the tax would be based on an ex ante estimate of the external
environmental harm that a given unit of carbon would contribute. 29
Presumably, the tax would be adjusted as the environment improves (or
worsens) or as scientists revise their estimates of the effect of carbon on
the atmosphere and on overall welfare.
In sum, tort law can be distinguished from non-tort regulation in
terms of who the regulator is (court rather than agency) and in terms of
the timing of the regulatory in-put (ex post rather than ex ante). 30 It
27

James Poterba, Tax Policy to Combat Global Warming: On the Designing a Carbon
Tax, in GLOBAL WARMING: ECONOMIC POLICY RESPONSES (200?) (Dorbusch, Rudiger
& James M. Poterba, eds.).
28
At least one commentator has suggested using tort law as a sort of ex post carbonbased judicially imposed tax.
Jonathon Zasloff, The Judicial Carbon Tax:
Reconstructing Public Nuisance and Climate Change, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1827 (2008).
29
Gilbert E. Metcalf and David A. Weisbach, Design of a Carbon Tax (January 8,
2009), U of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 447; U of Chicago,
Public
Law
Working
Paper
No.
254.
Available
at
SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1324854.
30
The ex ante/ex post distinction between command-and-control regulation and tort law
is somewhat overstated in the text. In fact, although many of the most important
command-and-control regulatory decisions occur before any actual harm occurs from
the activity in question (as with pre-market approval for certain types of products or
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should also be noted, however, that negligence and strict liability each
have their agency-based ex ante equivalent. That is to say, a fault-based
tort regime can be understood as an ex post version of command-andcontrol regulation implemented through the court system, one that is
initiated or triggered by those who have been harmed. And a strict
liability tort regime can be understood as a particular type of ex post
Pigovian tax.
Given the preceding analysis, it makes sense that there would be
a standard normative framework for evaluating alternative regulatory
tools, including tort law, and for deciding which tool is most efficient for
which situation. And there is. 31 Thus, ex ante agency-based regulation
is considered preferable to ex post tort liability when the regulatory
agency is thought to have superior (or cheaper access to) information
regarding the risks of the regulated activity than does the regulated party
and when there are concerns about insolvent or judgment proof
injurers. 32 Alternatively, ex post tort liability may be preferable when
judgment-proofness is not an issue and when potential injurers have
better ex ante information about the potential harms than do the
regulators. And so the argument goes.
Criminal Law and other Non-Monetary Sanctions
Note that if the risky activity in question has a socially optimal
level of zero (that is, the activity should simply be banned), then the
efficient penalty under the traditional economic analysis would be large
product-safety innovations), it is not as if, once the agency has approved the
activity/product, it can never revisit its decision or make adjustments to take into
account new information, including information about actual post-approval loss
experience. But many agencies are notoriously bad at acting aggressively on new
negative information regarding previously approved activities, which is part of the
reason that the tort suits arise, of course. This suggests, however, that the ex post/ex
ante distinction does capture something of continuing significance in the world.
31
Donald Wittman & Michelle White, A Comparison of Regulation and Liability Rules
Under Imperfect Information, J. Legal Stud. (1983); Shavell, supra note __; Charles D.
Kolstad, Thomas S. Ulen and Gary V. Johnson, Ex Post Liability for Harm versus Ex
Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? 80 Am. Econ. Rev. 888 (1990).
For a more recent application of this framework within the economic literature, see
Joshua Schwartzstein & Andrei Shleifer, Litigation and Regulation (Feb. 19, 2009)
(unpublished
manuscript,
available
online
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1344505).
32
Ex post regulation works only if the regulated party anticipates having sufficient
assets to pay the full harm caused by its activity ex post. Shavell, supra.
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– large enough to fully deter the activity in question at the lowest
administrative cost. 33 This analysis suggests that this extreme sort of
deterrence is one role for the criminal law: to identify behavior whose
optimal activity level is zero and then, at the lowest administrative costs
possible, deter the behavior completely – or come as close as reasonably
possible to doing so. Consider, for example, intentionally caused harms.
These are considered socially undesirable, either on intrinsic grounds or
because they are thought to undermine social-welfare maximization; and
therefore those who cause intentional harms face the prospect of criminal
sanction, in addition to potential tort liability. Of course, even if the
ideal level of some activity is zero, the administrative costs necessary to
achieve that ideal may not be cost-justified. Put differently, given the
administrative/enforcement costs associated with any regulatory or law
enforcement regime, the truly (all-things-considered) optimal level of
even socially undesirable activities may be positive. This is the familiar
point that, in a sense, the globally optimal level of crime – given
enforcement costs (and given human nature) – is probably not zero.
I should also point out another standard conclusion in the L&E
deterrence literature: that criminal sanctions will not always be the most
efficient way to deter even clearly undesirable behavior. This is true for
a bunch of reasons, but let’s focus on one: Insofar as criminal sanctions
involve non-monetary sanctions (again: prison), such sanctions are
inherently less efficient than monetary sanctions – not because prisons
are more costly to run than are systems of monetary transfers (though
that is almost certainly true most of the time), but because there is a
fundamental theoretical asymmetry between monetary sanction and nonmonetary sanctions. This asymmetry is that monetary sanctions involve
transfers whereas non-monetary sanctions generally do not. 34 Thus,
when a criminal spends time in jail and is deprived of his liberty and his
ability to produce income, it causes him to experience a reduction in
utility, which is the source of the desired deterrent effect.
A monetary sanction that reduces the criminal’s utility by the
same amount in theory has the same deterrent effect. The difference is
that with the monetary sanction there is also a commensurate increase in
someone else’s utility, whoever enjoys the benefit of the cash transfer.
33

This is how economists tend to understand the line between what behaviors are
criminalized and which are not. See, e.g., Becker, supra note, __; Shavell, supra note
__; and Polinsky, supra note __.
34
Becker, supra note __.
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For example, although tort damages lower the injurer’s utility (that’s
what makes them a sanction), they also increase the money available to
the victim (or to her first-party insurer if it is a subrogation suit). A
similar point could be made about Pigovian taxes or government fines
generally: Because they are transfers, they do not entail any necessary
net loss of utility, as the tax dollars can be spent on something. With a
non-monetary sanction, however, there is no necessary offsetting benefit
to anyone else in society – other than the deterrence effect itself. Hence,
the general preference among economists for monetary sanctions over
non-monetary sanctions, such as a jail sentence. 35
Of course, monetary sanctions are not always feasible. Indeed,
that conclusion serves as the basis for the standard economic argument
for the all-things-considered second-best efficiency of non-monetary
sanctions in some settings. For example, if a potential injurer is
judgment proof, the argument goes, non-monetary sanctions may be the
only, or the least-cost, way to provide optimal deterrence. This is the
standard economic account for why we need criminal penalties other
than mere monetary sanctions. 36 Along the same lines, for many types
of relatively minor but incredibly numerous offenses, it would obviously
be too costly to involve the legal system. Instead, society regulates such
everyday behavior with non-legal norms that are backed up by informal
non-transfer sanctions. Sometimes those sanctions are external, imposed
by the relevant community; other times – when the social norms have, by
nature or nurture, been “internalized” by the parties – the sanctions are
internal in the form of guilt or shame.
These conclusions regarding non-monetary sanctions, among the
most basic points in the standard economic deterrence theory, have been
made clearly and repeatedly with respect to criminal sanctions in
particular. 37 Interestingly, however, the very same point could be made
(but never is) about most informal non-legal sanctions. That is, in the
35

This analysis also assumes that there are no third-party “psychic benefits” enjoyed by
those who get pleasure from knowing that criminals are languishing in prison, or at
least knowing that they are not roaming the streets. It also ignores any intrinsic value
society might place on punishing criminals for wrongdoing. As discussed more fully in
Part V below, this assumption has implications for how systems of non-monetary
sanctions should be coordinated with tort law.
36
Id.
37
See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals, 17 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 409 (1980) (arguing for replacing jail sentences with criminal fines when
feasible).
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large L&E literature on social norms and informal sanctions as an
alternative to legal rules and formal sanctions, nothing is said about the
fact that most informal sanctions have the same inherent efficiency
drawback as criminal sanctions: in that informal sanctions are, for the
most part, non-transfer sanctions. So, when scholars writing about the
efficiency (or lack of efficiency) of social norms, the sanctions they
generally have in mind are such things as loss of reputation, public
shaming or humiliation, or perhaps ostracism from the community – all
non-transfer sanctions. 38 But the scholars do not talk about the fact that
such sanctions are, in this one arguably narrow respect, inferior to
transfer sanctions (in the very same way that jail sentences are inferior to
fines), and for the same deadweight-loss reason. 39 I will have more to
say on this subject in Part V.
The Benefits of Regulatory Coordination
If we think of tort law as a system of regulation, we can compare
it with other regulatory approaches, including command-and-control and
Pigovian ex ante regulation. Further, insofar as the criminal law and
informal social norms have the effect of altering ex ante incentives, those
“systems of regulation” (if we can call them that) should also be taken
into account as well. More generally, given that different regulatory
approaches have different strengths and weaknesses in different
situations, the social planner who is seeking to minimize overall social
costs and while maximizing overall social benefits should in theory
design a overarching regulatory strategy that takes all of these various
factors into account.

38

Of course, in some cases, informal social sanctions will have the quality of a transfer.
For example, when one firm suffers a loss of profits due to its loss of reputation in the
community for the breaching some social norm, if other firms in the same business then
experience a commensurate increase in profits (because of the shift in customers from
the sanctioned firm), then the reputational sanction is essentially the same as a fine, in
the sense of creating no necessary social waste. Of course, the incidence of this sort of
fine will likely be different from that of tort damages or of a Pigovian tax, but that is a
different issue. The one article I have found that discusses the possibility that informal
social sanctions might have fine-line qualities is Cooter & Porat, which I discuss at
some length below.
39
Indeed, just as Judge Posner argues for using criminal fines to replace jail sentences
(in situations in which the judgment-proofness of the criminals does not make fines
ineffectual), one could argue for substituting transfer sanctions for non-legal informal
sanctions when possible.
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For example, we might imagine that, for a given type of risky
activity, the optimal regulatory regime would include all of the
following: (a) agency-based command-and-control regulations requiring
some minimal safety measures that are efficient for all potential injurers
engaged in this type of activity; (b) an additional ex ante Pigovian tax
that represents the agency’s best estimate of the residual risk of the
unpreventable harm likely to be caused by the activity; (c) ex post strict
tort liability for the actual harm caused to particular injured parties (with
an offset for the amount of the ex ante Pigovian tax already paid by the
manufacturer); and (d) criminal responsibility if a regulated party
actually intentionally violates the command-and-control regulations or in
some other way causes in intentional harm. I do not mean to suggest that
this is necessarily the best mix of regulatory approaches; it is just one
possibility. The point here is only that it clearly makes sense to have
some sort of regulatory coordination so as to take advantage of the
strengths of the different approaches, to avoid over-deterrence, and to
minimize the overall administrative costs of the system. Ideally, such
coordination would come from the legislature or from an agency that has
been delegated this role by the legislature.
As mentioned in the introduction, this Article will take a
somewhat different approach. Rather than take the position of a
legislature or agency seeking to achieve optimal regulatory coordination
by manipulating a range of regulatory tools, I adopt here a tort-centric
perspective: that is, the perspective of tort lawmakers (whether common
law court or tort-reformist legislature) that are trying to develop a set of
principles that rationally coordinate existing (assumed to be fixed) nontort regulatory rules with tort law so as to achieve the overall goal of
creating optimal ex ante risk-reduction incentives at the lowest possible
administrative costs. 40 In the next two Parts, I use the example of two
particular overlapping regulatory instruments to sketch the basic
normative framework of the piece. The two instruments that require
coordination are tort law (where the operative liability rule is assumed to
be negligence) and command-and-control agency-based regulation. I
begin with these two regulatory instruments in part because one has to
start somewhere, but also because it is this particular coordination issue
that courts are actually (and currently) trying to figure out. To simplify
40

Do I think this is what tort courts are actually doing? One can certainly find language
in published tort opinions expressly adopting a deterrence or regulatory type of
framework, especially in products liability cases. However, one can also find language
suggesting that other considerations, such as corrective justice, are also at work.
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the analysis, I assume in Parts III and IV that the only deterrence variable
is potential-injurer care levels. In part V, I reintroduce the activity-level
variable and consider other tort/regulatory coordination problems,
specifically those involving criminal law and social norms.
III. Tort Law and Overlapping Command-and-Control Regulation
Fully Optimizing Command-and-Control Regulation : Absolute
Displacement
We begin this Part with a rather extreme example. Imagine a
hypothetical in which tort law must coordinate with a command-andcontrol regulatory regime that is “fully optimizing” in the sense that it
gives potential injurers the ex ante incentive to take all cost-justified
steps to minimize third-party harms. Put differently, the regulatory
agency in question is able to identify (with perfect accuracy) the
specifically efficient (or “precisely efficient”) level of safety investment
for each regulated party – not just the “efficient floor” (in the sense of
the minimal level of safety investment that should be required of all
regulated parties) or the “efficient ceiling” (in the sense of the maximum
level of safety above which no regulated party should invest, or be
required to invest). 41
These concepts can best be explained through a series of simple
examples. Suppose there is a class of potential injurers who engage in an
activity that the regulator has determined poses a 1 in 1000 chance of
causing a $100,000 harm to some third-party victim. Assume also that
there is a $30 precaution that each potential injurer could take that would
41

I am using the terms “floor” and “ceiling” in similarly idiosyncratic way. In the
preemption literature, these terms refer usually to the limits imposed on state
regulations that overlap with federal regulations. On this view, a federal regulatory
floor would prevent a state regulator (legislature, court, whatever) from permitting the
regulated party to invest less than the federally mandated minimal level of care.
Likewise on this view, a federal regulatory ceiling would prevent the state regulator
from requiring the regulated party to invest in level of care that is higher than the
federally mandated maximal level of care. And I sometimes use the terms floor and
ceiling this way; however, I also use them to refer to the requirements imposed by the
regulator (whether that regulator is a federal or state agency) on the regulated parties
themselves. Thus, if a given regulatory standard (whether adopted at the state or federal
level, whether a legal rule or an informal norm) were to require that all regulated parties
invest in some minimal level of safety, I would call such a requirement a regulatory
floor. And if the regulatory standard set a cap on how much the regulated party is
allowed to invest in safety precautions, that would be a ceiling.
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completely eliminate this $100 risk. (This $30 safety investment could
be a particular safety feature on, say, a motor vehicle or medical device;
or it could be a more detailed or sophisticated warning label for a
particular consumer product). And assume that there is no other
precaution that could be taken that would produce a cost-justified
reduction in expected harms. Under these assumptions, then, the $30
precaution represents the precisely efficient level of care on the part of
the potential injurers; all regulated parties should take this, and only this,
level of care; it is both the efficient floor and the efficient ceiling of care.
If they spend less or more than this on safety, they are wasting
resources. 42
Given all of these assumptions, the efficient command-andcontrol regulatory response would be for the regulator simply to require
all potential injurers to make the $30 safety investment to be allowed to
engage in the activity. That is, unless this safety investment was made,
the activity would be banned. The regulator would then back up this
command-and-control requirement with a threatened sanction, something
that was (in terms of disutility to the potential injurer) enough to induce
the potential injurer to make the obviously efficient safety investment.
In this example, any sanction imposing a cost greater than $30 would do
the trick.
Again, this non-tort command-and-control regulatory regime
fully optimizes potential injurer care levels under the assumptions of the
example. Given that fact, what regulatory role should tort law play?
The answer is none. Tort law as a regulatory regime here would be
redundant, in which case there is no need to incur the famously high
administrative costs of running the tort system. Put differently, if
deterrence is already being handled efficiently by some non-tort
regulatory regime, then, under the economic view of tort law, there is no
need to allow tort causes of action in those cases. Does this mean that I
am arguing for the elimination of tort law? Of course not. The
conclusion one should draw from this analysis depends on one’s view of
the various assumptions in particular contexts – the assumptions of the
42

The analysis in the text assumes that the benefit of the activity to the potential injurer
is greater than $30; otherwise, the activity would simply be banned. It also assumes
that this benefit is not affected by the investment (or non-investment) in the $30 safety
precaution. Note also that, if due care is taken in this case, there are no activity level
issues, as I have assumed there is no residual risk associated with the activity. Activitylevel issues are taken up in Part V below.
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fully optimizing nature of the non-tort system of deterrence, for example.
As discussed in greater detail below, if the regulatory regime is less than
fully optimizing, tort law should play an important deterrence/regulatory
role. 43
But again, at least in theory (and perhaps occasionally in
practice), when there is fully optimizing agency-based ex ante safety
regulation (and the various assumptions of the analysis apply), the fact
that tort law may be redundant of already existing non-tort regulation
should not be ignored. And just to be clear, the concern in this idealized
example is not with excessive deterrence per se. Assuming both
standards are set and applied optimally, we would not be worried that a
C&C regulatory regime and an overlapping negligence standard in tort
would lead to excessive investment in care by the regulated parties. If
we assume that courts and agencies both reach roughly the same
conclusion in terms of what level of safety investment would be optimal
for the regulated parties (and they both get this determination roughly
right), then imposing a negligence regime on top of the ex ante
command-and-control regulation would produce the same optimal ex
ante investment in safety as would either of those regulatory instruments
by themselves. If tort law, for example, threatens to impose damages of,
say, $100,000 if the injurer failed to make the $30 safety investment and
the harm occurred, and the agency threatened to impose a fine of $100 if
the same safety investment were not made, what would happen? The
potential injurer would indeed spend the $30, but no more than that.
This is just the nature of a discontinuous – all-or-nothing – regulatory
standard such as negligence. 44 The problem in the example, then, is not
over-deterrence but the duplicative and unnecessary administrative costs

43

Although beyond the scope of the current analysis, my own view is that in many
contexts (including many contexts involving consumer product safety regulation), nontort safety regulation is far from fully optimizing and tort law should play an important
regulatory function. For an argument that enterprise liability can be an efficient form of
product market regulation, for example, see Hanson & Logue (1990).
44
Just as the all-or-nothing trigger within negligence law is the concept of “due care”
(either the potential injurer has taken due care and is therefore immune from liability or
she has not and is not), the all-or-nothing trigger within command-and-control
regulation tends to be something like the pre-market approval process for a new drug or
new medical device under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act. Either the drug/device
is approved, or it is not.
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of the two systems, costs for which there would be no offsetting
deterrence benefit. 45
At this point, it bears reminding that we are assuming no
compensatory or corrective justice role for tort law. For those
commentators, policymakers, judges (and readers of this Article) who do
not accept that assumption, these administrative expenses may be worth
the cost. Indeed, if corrective justice through tort law is something
society cares about, then the administrative costs of running the tort
system in this example are not duplicative at all. Rather, they are paying
for something that the C&C agency regulation is not providing.
However, if tort law is exclusively about deterrence (costinternalization/regulation), such deterrence in this example is being
accomplished fully by other means. Therefore, the optimal rule of
coordination in this case would be one that called for full displacement
or preemption of tort law. 46
45

Overlapping tort sanctions and regulatory sanctions can, of course, produce overdeterrence, if we change the assumptions a bit. That is, if we imagine that there is
potential error in the decisions of courts handling tort cases (perhaps in the
determination of negligence or in the calculation of damages), then regulated parties –
potential injurers – may in fact take greater than optimal care. That is, they may overcomply or invest too much, more than is cost-justified, in accident prevention in order
to eliminate the possibility of liability. On the other hand, the presence of such
uncertainty also creates an incentive to under-comply, as there is the possibility of the
court making a mistake in the other direction. Which effect will dominate depends on
the situation. In any event, these effects are present whether or not there is an
overlapping non-tort sanctioning regime that is already, either fully or partially,
regulating the conduct in question. See generally John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell,
Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 Va. L. Rev. 965
(1984) (showing how uncertainty may influence parties’ incentives to invest in harm
prevention); Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal
Standards, 2 J.L. Econ. & Org. 279 (1986) (exploring the effects of uncertainty under
various penalty regimes).
46
“Displacement” is the term I am using for either when the tort system borrows the
standard of liability from some non-tort system of regulation (e.g., when it borrows the
standard of care from a regulation or from custom) or when the tort system declines to
impose a sanction because of an existing non-tort sanction.
The concept of
“preemption,” therefore, is a particular type of displacement. In the legal literature, the
word preemption generally is used to refer to when there is conflicting federal and state
law and, owing to the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, federal law displaces
the conflicting state law. Displacement more generally, however, includes not only
displacement of state tort law principles by federal law but also of displacement of tort
law principles by other non-tort regulatory regimes, such as state safety regulations or
criminal law or even social norms. Thus, for example, when a state legislature passes a
law eliminating a class of tort claims in situations in which there has been compliance
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What would this conclusion look like in practice? For one thing,
if the agency regulation (the standards and the enforcement of those
standards) is fully optimizing, not only should compliance with the
agency’s promulgated standard displace tort liability, but also noncompliance with that standard should not give rise to tort liability.
Indeed, both compliance and non-compliance with the non-tort
regulatory standard should be considered entirely irrelevant to the torts
analysis. I call this extreme scenario, when a non-tort regime completely
supersedes or displaces the tort regime, “absolute displacement” or “full
displacement,” meaning that the non-tort regulatory regime displaces tort
law both in cases of compliance and in cases of non-compliance with the
non-tort regulatory standard.
Does this sort of absolute displacement exist anywhere in the
law? There are areas where Congress has in effect replaced all (or
almost all) state tort law claims with some other regime of regulation and
compensation. Examples include the areas of nuclear energy, 47
childhood vaccines, 48 and even 9/11-related claims. 49 There are also
areas in which state legislatures have taken the lead in preempting
common law tort actions, areas such as workers’ compensation (where
workplace tort claims against employers have largely been replaced by a
no-fault insurance regime) and automobile accidents (where a few U.S.
states have moved in the direction of a no-fault or modified no-fault
compensation scheme). In all of these fields, lawmakers have essentially
eliminated tort law as a system of regulation, and they have done so in
part because of the existence of some non-tort system of regulation. For
example, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission imposes strict ex
ante command-and-control regulatory specifications on all nuclear
power facilities in the U.S. The other important common feature of these
examples is the belief that there already exists, or there will be provided
as part of the new regulatory regime, an adequate form of direct
compensation for victims.
I should emphasize that what I am calling absolute displacement
(i.e., when tort law is completely displaced by a given non-tort
with relevant federal safety standards, that would be displacing of tort law in the sense
in which I am using the term.
47
Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act.
48
The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986.
49
September 11 Victim Compensation Act.
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regulatory regime such that tort remedies are not available) would be
efficient only if two conditions are simultaneously present: first, the
non-tort regulator must set a standard of care that is precisely efficient
for all regulated parties; second, the regulator must have in place an
effective means of monitoring and enforcing those standards. The
second part of this formula can raise its own special issues. Not only
must the regulator be able to deal with unintentional noncompliance (i.e.,
regulated parties who, in good faith, believe they are in compliance with
the standards but, in the regulator’s view, are not); 50 the regulator must
also deal with intentional noncompliance. For example, the regulator
must be able to detect and punish parties who are engaging in an
unregulated black-market version of a regulated activity. These parties
are simply bypassing the regulatory process and hoping to elude
detection. In addition, a fully optimizing regulatory regime must be able
to deal with parties who do procure regulatory approval but who do so
through the use of fraud or deceit. In both types of non-compliance, a
fully-optimizing regulator would have the ability to detect the
wrongdoing and, through the threat of monetary sanctions and criminal
penalties, deter it.

Partially Optimizing Regulation
If the existence of a fully optimizing – i.e., precisely efficient,
fully enforced – non-tort system of regulation would mean that tort law
should be fully displaced, when should tort law still play a
deterrence/cost-internalization role, even when there is a pre-existing
non-tort regulatory regime that applies to the activity in question? The
answer is straightforward, at least in theory: whenever the existing nontort system of regulation is only partially optimizing, in either of two
senses. First, partially optimizing can mean that the non-tort regulatory
standard (e.g., the care level being enforced by the agency) is only
minimally efficient, in that it calls for only that investment in riskreduction that all potential injurers engaged in the activity should make,
but that may not be sufficient for some subset of potential injurers. This
is what is sometimes meant by the term “efficient floor.” Second,
partially efficient could mean that the regulatory standard (or care level)
is precisely efficient (both floor-and-ceiling efficient, as defined above),
50

Noncompliance of this sort can result when there is substantive uncertainty as to
precisely how the regulatory standard should be applied to a given party’s particular
situation.
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but is not optimally enforced by the regulator. 51 The following sections
discuss how tort law should be, and in some cases may already be,
coordinated with these two types of partially optimizing regulatory
regimes.
Minimally Efficient Regulatory Standards: No Displacement
Using the example from above, consider the following picture of
what a minimally efficient regulatory standard might look like and how
tort law might coordinate with such a standard. Imagine that there is a
$5 investment that all potential injurers (i.e., all parties engaged in the
risky activity) could make that would reduce the expected harm
associated with the activity by $20. (Say it would reduce the probability
of the $100,000 harm from .001 to .0008.) For some subset of potential
injurers, however, assume that an additional $25 investment should also
be made because that additional investment would reduce the risk even
further, from an expected harm of $80 to zero (from probability .008 to
nothing). For those potential injurers, $30 is the precisely efficient level
of investment in care. For the remaining potential injurers, it would cost
more than $80 to eliminate the residual $80 risk; thus, for them, $5 is the
precisely efficient level of care. Let us also assume that, although the
agency regulator can identify ex ante the general class of potential
injurers, it cannot distinguish the $30-efficient-care folks from the $5efficient-care folks. As a result, the best the regulator can do is require
all potential injurers to make the $5 safety expenditure and leave the
courts (applying a negligence analysis ex post) to determine which
injurers should have made the additional $25 investment.

51

It is also theoretically possible that the federal regulator could set an efficient ceiling
only, in the sense of establishing a standard of care that regulated parties are not
allowed to exceed and that state regulators, including state tort law qua regulation, may
not require the regulated parties to exceed. Such a ceiling might make sense if
additional expenditures on enhanced safety beyond the ceiling were clearly socially
wasteful, perhaps because they substantially undermined the value of the regulated
activity. An example would be where requiring manufacturers of a given product to
include an especially expensive safety feature that made the device essentially unusable
for its designed function or too costly for anyone to afford. Because the standard would
be a ceiling only, however, investing less in safety than the ceiling provides would
presumably not be considered noncompliance with the standard. Thus, so long as the
regulated party invested less than the maximal amount, there could still be room for a
negligence suit. If, however, if the regulated party made the maximally efficient
investment (invested up to the ceiling), state tort claims would be preempted.
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Examples of this sort of minimally efficient safety investment are
easy to imagine. For example, the Department of Transportation might
determine that the benefits exceed the costs for all cars and trucks be
equipped with frontal airbags, which therefore could be made a minimal
requirement for all cars and trucks. However, it might be determined
that the overall efficiency of passenger-side airbags depends on a number
of factors that are better left open to the discretion of the auto-makers but
subject to the after-the-fact regulation of potential products liability suits
against auto manufacturers. Likewise, we might imagine a similar sort
of story applying to labeling requirements for prescription drugs: certain
minimally informative labels might be required, leaving the possibility of
additional warnings to the interplay of the marketplace and the tort
system. 52
This scenario, then, obviously anticipates an important
complementary ex post deterrence role for tort law. In such cases,
although the agency regulation may give all potential injurers the
incentive to make the minimally efficient care-level investments, only
the threat of ex post tort liability would induce the low-avoidance-cost
potential injurers to make that efficient additional $25 safety investment.
Thus, compliance with a minimally efficient regulatory standard of care
should clearly not, from regulatory perspective, be preemptive of state
tort law claims.
This conclusion, again, depends on a number of key assumptions.
For example, the analysis assumes not only that courts can recognize
when the universe of potential injurers potential injurers but also,
critically, that courts can, in their ex post negligence analysis, accurately
sort the $5- from the $30-efficient-care injurers, in a way that the agency
cannot ex ante. In addition, as with the economic analysis of torts
generally, this conclusion assumes that potential injurers themselves are
perfectly informed and perfectly rational. What that means in this
context is that potential injurers themselves can figure out ex ante which
category they fall into (the $5 care-level category or the $30 care-level
category) and that they believe that if they under-invest in safety (spend
$5 when they should spend $30) they will, in the event of an injury, be
held liable ex post by a court for the full harm they cause. If these
assumptions do not hold, tort law cannot be assumed to have a beneficial
52

One special concern with warnings, of course, is the problem of warning overload. If
a warning label contains too many listed hazards, the effect can be to overwhelm the
intended audience and even to cause them to ignore the warnings altogether.
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ex ante deterrence effect on care levels. If these assumptions do hold,
then the threat of such complementary tort liability will give potential
injurers the overall efficient ex ante care-level incentives – and with no
problems of redundant sanctions.53
As most lawyers will recognize, the common law of tort actually
has a tort doctrine that is roughly (or at least potentially) consistent with
the conclusion that regulatory compliance should not be displacing (or
preemptive) of tort law in this setting. According to the Third
Restatement of Torts, the doctrine of statutory or regulatory compliance
provides that, although compliance with a statute or regulation is of
evidentiary value to the question of negligence, it does not preclude a
finding of negligence in a tort case.54 Thus, assuming of course there is
no express preemptive language in the relevant statute or regulation,
regulatory compliance is generally not considered preemptive or
displacing of a tort law claim under the basic common law doctrine. A
similar statement of this soft regulatory compliance principle can be
found in the Products Liability Restatement. 55 Thus, although courts
generally suggest that regulatory compliance is relevant to the
negligence question (in the sense that the fact finder is not forbidden
from taking such regulatory compliance into account), the general rule in
a majority of states seems to be that the court is free in such cases to
apply something like the Hand BPL analysis or its equivalent to evaluate
the efficiency of the care taken by the particular injurer in the suit before
it. 56

53

Even if the non-tort regulator has in place sufficient sanctions to induce compliance
with the minimal standard, allowing the tort system to be a “backup” will not lead to
excessive care-levels, for the reasons discussed in the previous section: Potential
injurers will be induced to take optimal care in order to avoid all possibility of having to
pay the $100,000 damage awards. Of course, the conclusion that tort law has an
important role to play in this type of situation also depends on the size of the universe
of $30 efficient-care potential injurers. That is, if in the example in the text, 99 percent
of potential injurers are $5 potential injurers and only 1 percent $30, the administrative
cost of having the tort system sort out that 1 percent would probably not be worth the
candle.
54
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm § 16 (2005).
55
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 4 (1998).
56
As will be discussed in greater detail below, courts applying the regulatory
compliance principle will look to legislative intent to determine if there is implied
preemption. The point here is that there common law doctrine itself does not, in the
absence of such implied or expressed legislative intent, treat compliance as preemptive.
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Is this doctrine in fact being applied by courts in a way that
optimizes the deterrence goal? Maybe. Maybe not. To answer that
question would take us well beyond the scope of the current project. The
point here is just that there is a tort doctrine on the books that is at least
consistent with the efficient approach to overlapping tort and non-tort
sanctions in the context of minimally efficient regulatory standards
(where the issue is injurer care levels).
Although most states have taken the approach of treating
regulatory compliance as merely relevant, some states have gone further
towards favoring the regulatory choices of regulatory agencies over
common law courts. Specifically, with respect to product liability claims
in particular, a number of states have enacted statutes that put a thumb on
the scale in situations in which there has been compliance with the nontort agency-based regulatory standard. In several states, for example, the
rule now is that, if a product manufacturer complies with a federal or
state regulatory standard, there will be a “rebuttable presumption”
against a finding of negligence or product defect. 57 Is this presumption
welfare enhancing? If this presumption can easily be overcome by a
showing that the regulation in question is best understood (or was clearly
intended by the regulator to be understood) as only an efficient
minimum, then it may well be an efficient rule, assuming that we have
some degree of confidence in the ability and willingness of the regulator
to do the job of identifying efficient minima. If the presumption is
difficult to overcome, however, these rules seem likely to be inefficient
and may well lead to under-deterrence rather than optimal coordination.
The regulation of many consumer products is notoriously inadequate. 58
And even when federal safety regulation is considered reasonably
effective, the resulting safety standards are often intended only to be
efficient minima only.
If compliance with a minimally efficient standard should not be
preemptive of a tort suit, what about noncompliance with the minimally
efficient regulatory standard? If it is certain that the regulatory standard
57

Colo. Rev. Stat. §13-21-403(1)(b) (2007); Ind. Code Ann. §34-20-5-1(2) (West
1999); Kan. Stat. Ann. §60-3304(a) (2005); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §411.310(2) (West
2005); N.J. Stat. Ann. §2A:58C-4 (West 2000); Tenn. Code Ann. §29-28-104 (2007);
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §82.007(a) (Vernon 2005); Utah Code Ann. §78-156(3) (2005).
58
The Consumer Product Safety Commission is the most obvious example. Because of
CPSC’s perennial underfunding and understaffing, it has long been, and still is,
considered to be largely ineffective in maintaining general consumer product safety.
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is minimally efficient for all potential injurers (as in the example above),
and if the court determines that the failure to make the investment in fact
increased the risk of the harm that is being sued for, there is an argument
to be made for allowing the court to apply a default rule of negligence
per se. NPS would allow the court to avoid the administrative expense
of a full-blown negligence analysis, with all of the accompanying expert
testimony and cross-examination of experts and so on.
Negligence per se would make sense in this case not only on
administrative cost grounds; it may also actually improve potentialinjurer care levels (compared with the full-blown ex post negligence
analysis). This could be true if there is a concern that some courts or
juries, applying their own ex post full-blown negligence analysis, will
make mistakes – specifically, that they will apply an inefficiently lax
standard of care that allows the injurer to avoid liability despite failing to
make even the minimally efficient safety investment. If such scenarios
are likely, then the doctrine of negligence per se could contribute directly
to improving the efficiency of potential-injurer care levels, by ensuring
that courts at least insist on the minimally efficient $5 investment for all
potential injurers.
In addition, the negligence per se doctrine might also contribute
to efficiency by enlisting the tort system to impose additional sanctions
for failure to meet the minimally efficient standard, when the ex ante
regulator has limited resources for enforcing its own standards. In such a
case, the court acts as an enforcer of the agency’s minimalist regulatory
standards. 59 Thus, if the non-tort regulator determines (correctly) that all
potential injurers should invest $5 in care, but the regulator does not
have the resources to enforce this minimal standard, the existence of a
tort regime applying a NPS doctrine will supplement the regulatory
incentive to comply with that minimally efficient standard. They (the
$5-efficient-care parties) can avoid negligence per se liability merely by
making the $5 minimal investment, which they will rationally do. And
so long as the traditional regulatory compliance doctrine applies (or even
the new rebuttable regulatory compliance defense), the $30-efficient-care
parties will still need to make the full $30 investment to avoid liability
under the full-blown negligence analysis.

59

Cross reference discussion infra of preemption cases.
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If, however, the non-tort agency regulator fully enforces the
minimally efficient standard (and thus all parties are already induced to
make the $5 floor investment in care), the NPS doctrine would not be
needed. In such a case, the only remaining regulatory task for tort law
would be to identify the $30-efficient-care individuals and to hold them
liable for not making the additional $25 investment. This conclusion
will be important when we focus on the criminal law in Part IV below.
There is of course an actual doctrine of negligence per se, which
is roughly consistent with the preceding discussion. According to the
Third Restatement of Torts, a finding of an injurer’s non-compliance
with a statutory or regulatory standard will result in a verdict of
negligence, provided that the regulatory standard in question was
designed to protect against the type of accident the injurer’s conduct
caused, and that the accident victim is within the class of persons the
statute or regulation was designed to protect. 60 Thus, if the example
above it could be shown that a particular potential injurer failed to spend
the $5 minimal safety investment, and that that failure created the sort of
risk that resulted in the harm to the victim in question, the goal of overall
cost minimization would be served by holding the defendant per se liable
in tort. Optimal deterrence would be achieved; and administrative costs
minimized. Again, this conclusion turns on some pretty strong
assumptions not only about the level of competence and commitment of
the regulatory agency in setting minimally efficient standards for all
potential injurers, but also about the inability of the regulator to police
such noncompliance on its own and thus the usefulness of tort liability in
such cases. 61
Note that there will be times when the injurer’s failure to satisfy
the regulatory standard should not qualify as negligence per se and
60

Restatement (Third) of Torts § 14. NPS can apply to any statutory or regulatory
safety-related rule, but it tends to be applied most often in the case of automobile
accidents, both because of the number of accidents and because of the number and
importance of the various statutory rules governing driving, such as speed limits, stop
signs, and the like. Id. at comment d. In other fields, where there are far fewer
statutory or regulatory rules governing the conduct of potential injurers (such as in the
field of medicine), NPS is a doctrine on which plaintiffs rely far less often.
61
Michigan has in effect statutorily reversed the common law NPS doctrine in products
cases (including but not limited to drug cases) by providing that evidence of
noncompliance with any federal or standard will not create a presumption of
negligence. This conclusion is consistent with the view that regulatory agencies should
be allowed to handle noncompliance with their regulations as they see fit. Thus, at least
for products suits against drug makers, the Michigan system amounts to a state-created
regime of absolute two-way regulatory preemption.
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should not be conclusive as to the defendant’s negligence. For example,
when a court can conclude that the injurer’s noncompliance with the
statute or regulation in question did not increase the particular risk that
gave rise to the plaintiff’s harm. To use the example from the text,
imagine that the $5 safety investment and $25 safety investment actually
correspond to risks that are causally unrelated. Say, for example, that
the $5 investment eliminates a $20 risk of harm A, and the $25 safety
investment eliminates a separate $80 risk of harm B. In such a case,
failure to make the $5 investment should not constitute negligence per se
with respect to harm B; indeed, under the assumptions here, the former is
irrelevant to the latter and should presumably not even be considered on
the question of negligence with respect to harm B.
Whether courts are in fact applying the NPS doctrine efficiently
is, again, difficult to say. But at least there is a doctrine that could be
used by courts to achieve efficient coordination with existing ex ante
C&C regulation in circumstances in which the minimal efficiency
scenario is believed to exist.
Precisely Efficient but Under-Enforced Regulatory Standards:
Partial Displacement
Another way in which a non-tort regulatory regime can be
partially optimizing (leaving an important complementary role for tort
law) would be if the regulatory standard is precisely efficient but underenforced, in the following sense: the standard (a) is both an efficient
floor and an efficient ceiling of conduct on the part of the regulated party
(as was the $30 investment for all regulated parties in the original
example above), but (b) the sanction (or the expected value of the
sanction) is too low to induce full compliance with that standard. Think
of a regulatory agency that has a large research budget for safety
research, but that has a relatively paltry enforcement budget (and little
stomach for fining the heck out of non-compliers), such that any
regulatory scofflaw’s prospect of being sanctioned by the agency is fairly
small. Going back to our example, imagine that the regulator determines
that all potential injurers should make the $30 safety investment, and the
regulator sets the penalty for failure to comply with the standard at $100.
However, because of budget constraints, the regulator is able to detect
only 1 in 100 instances of noncompliance, a fact known by the regulated
parties. This reduces the expected penalty to $1, not enough to induce
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compliance. How might tort law supplement non-tort regulatory law in
such a case?
Obviously tort law might provide a helpful supplementary
sanction in this case. For those potential injurers who fail to comply
with the standard, there would be a 1 in 1000 chance of having to pay a
$100,000 tort damage award. This threat would be more than enough to
induce full compliance. What is more interesting, however, is how tort
law should deal with the question of compliance or non-compliance with
a precisely efficient but under-enforced regulatory standard. As it turns
out, if achieving efficient ex ante incentives is the goal, not only should
noncompliance with the regulatory standard constitute negligence per se
(for the reasons already discussed), but compliance with the standard
should result in a finding of “non-negligence per se.” In other words,
when the non-tort regulatory standard is both an efficient floor and
ceiling but the sanction is inadequate, tort law should still apply in cases
of non-compliance with the regulatory standard (unlike in the full
displacement situation described above).
Moreover, to save on
administrative costs, the non-tort regulatory standard should in effect be
substituted for the common law court’s own application of the
negligence standard. 62
Summary
Under the framework set out above, when the non-tort regulatory
regime is fully optimizing – has a precisely efficient standard of care that
is fully enforced – tort law should be absolutely displaced. In the case of
federal non-tort risk regulation, what this means is that tort law in such
situations should be fully preempted. When, however, the non-tort
regime merely sets an efficient minimum standard of care—an efficient
floor – there should be no displacement (or preemption) of tort law; the
common law court should apply the doctrine of negligence per se, but
the court should not treat compliance as decisive on the question nonnegligence. Finally, when the non-tort regime is partially optimizing in
62

This assumes, of course, that the floor and ceiling is the same – that is, it calls for a
single, precisely efficient level of care. It is also possible to imagine a regulatory
standard that sets a floor and a ceiling that are different. Using our example, the
regulator might set a floor of $5 (if everyone should make that level of investment) and
a ceiling of $30 (as anything above $30 is a waste of resources). In that case, we would
have to think of the floor and the ceiling as separate requirements, and each would have
different implications (in terms of compliance and noncompliance), both of which were
discussed above.
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the sense of setting a precisely efficient (floor-and-ceiling) standard of
care, but one that is not adequately enforced by the agency regulator, tort
law should deploy both negligence per se and non-negligence per se
such that compliance and noncompliance with the regulatory standards
would be wholly decisive of the negligence question in the tort suit. In
this third situation, then, non-tort regulatory standards should only be
partially displacing or preemptive of common law tort claims – i.e.,
when there is full regulatory compliance. 63
IV. Examples of Displacement of State Products Liability Claims
State Statutory Displacement of Tort Law
In applying the three different coordination rules set out in the
previous Part, a critical question is how a court is to decide which is
appropriate for a given situation. Sometimes the choice will be easy, if
only because the legislature has made the choice clear. If the legislature
(federal or state) has clearly stated what the coordination principle
should be, then, barring some unlikely constitutional constraint, that is
that. We might call that “express displacement.” 64 As mentioned above,
a number of states have enacted statutes altering the common law rules
for coordinating tort claims with state and federal product safety
regulations, creating a sort of rebuttable regulatory compliance defense.
The Michigan legislature has gone one step further than merely creating
a presumption in favor of non-negligence in cases of regulatory
compliance. In 1996 Michigan became the first and only state to
immunize drug makers from tort liability in cases in which drug
manufacturers have complied with FDA standards and are using FDAapproved labels. Specifically, if FDA compliance is shown in such a
case, the drug in question is conclusively assumed not to be defective or
unreasonably dangerous. 65 No other state has gone this far.
If we project an efficiency/cost-minimization rationale on the
Michigan state legislature, the assumption underlying the statute would
63

Again, one could either imagine common law courts making these coordination
decisions or, as discussed in the next section, legislatures adopting these coordination
rules that common law tort courts would be required to apply.
64
Again I use the term preemption to describe any sort of displacement of state tort
liability by some non-tort system of deterrence. Express preemption can also result
from an agency pronouncement, if the agency is acting within its properly delegated
authority.
65
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §600.2946(5) (West 2007).
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seem to be that FDA regulation of drug manufacturers fits the
description of the partially optimizing agency regulation that (a) sets a
floor-and-ceiling (rather than floor only) efficient standard of care but (b)
that may require some state involvement in the enforcement of that
precisely efficient standard.
The minimally-efficient-standard
assumption can be seen in the fact that compliance is considered decisive
as to non-negligence (non-negligence per se), and non-compliance seems
to disable the tort-displacing effect of the immunity statute – thus
making possible the application of negligence per se. The statute
preserves some minimal backup enforcement role for tort law, inasmuch
as it includes exceptions for cases in which the manufacturer committed
fraud in the regulatory process or if the manufacturer fails to comply
with the required FDA labeling. Thus, the Michigan legislature seems to
have adopted a partial displacement regime.
Whether this means that the Michigan drug liability regime
promotes efficient deterrence depends on the various assumptions that
underlie the analysis. However, if you believe that drug manufacturers
will be responsive to tort liability qua regulation and are not likely to be
judgment proof, and you hold the view that the FDA regulation of drugs
is at best only partially optimizing (either in the efficient-floor sense or
under-enforced floor-and-ceiling sense), than state legislation adopting
what amounts to a blanket displacement of tort law as a supplementary
tool for regulating drug-maker incentives seems highly dubious.
Interestingly, the Michigan statute seems to regard as irrelevant whether
Congress or the FDA itself intended a greater (complementary)
regulatory role for state tort law with respect to drug manufacturers. This
is the sort of information that, as mentioned above, might be taken into
account in those states that have adopted only rebuttable presumptions
against a finding of negligence or product defect rather than outright
displacement of such claims. Of course, from the perspective of a court
applying applicable state and federal law (which is the perspective I have
generally taken in this Article), there seems to be little discretion in the
interpretation of the statute. In Michigan, with respect to the regulation
of drug manufacturers, tort law has a very minimal role. 66

66

Of course, Michigan (or any state for that matter) gets to decide the scope of its own
products liability law, even if that means defining the cause of action in a manner that
borrows from federal standards. If Congress wants to guaranty that tort law will be
uses in every state as a serious form of safety regulation in any particular field, it would
have to create federal private rights of action.
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Federal Preemption of State Tort Claims
The most well-known examples of legislative displacement of
state tort claims, however, come at the federal level; and this sort of
displacement – better known as preemption – can also be express or
implied. Congress, for example, sometimes expressly and specifically
provides that certain federal safety standards are to be understood as
preemptive of all state regulation, which has been interpreted to include
state tort claims. 67 An example of this would be FDA regulation of
medical devices, which regulation the Supreme Court recently held to be
preemptive of state tort claims. 68 More often than not, however,
Congress prefers to be (or for whatever reason ends up being) unclear
about its intentions on the tort law coordination/preemption question,
leaving courts with the task of determining what degree of preemption, if
any, the legislature meant to impose. In the absence of clear statutory
direction on the coordination question, a court hearing a tort case will
presumably fall back on the sorts of common law doctrines already
discussed, including the doctrines of negligence per se, regulatory
compliance, and the like. In such situations, when courts have some
discretion in the matter, how should they decide the overlapping-sanction
coordination issue?
The framework of this Article suggests a tentative answer: courts
(at least appellate courts who are given the ultimate task of interpreting
and implementing the boundaries between common law tort claims and
non-tort regulatory regimes) should consider the nature of the non-tort
regulation at issue and whether the goal of efficient deterrence (i.e.,
creating optimal ex ante accident-avoidance incentives at the lowest
administrative cost) would best be achieved if that regulation is
understood as an efficient floor or as both an efficient floor and an
efficient ceiling. If the regulation in question is an efficient floor only,
then a conclusion of no displacement – or no preemption – would be
optimal; and negligence per se should be applied in cases of
noncompliance. If, because of the nature of the regulatory process in
question, the regulation is likely to involve an efficient floor-and-ceiling
(a precisely efficient standard of care) but additional state-level
enforcement would be useful, then a symmetrical rule of negligence and
non-negligence per se would make sense – or one-way
67

Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996); and Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505
U. S. 504 (1992).
68
Riegel v. Medtronic (USSC 2008).
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displacement/preemption. And, of course, if it happens to be a case in
which federal regulation seems to be fully optimizing, the court could
reach the full displacement/preemption conclusion, although, again, that
would be an extreme result and should not be reached lightly. 69
Is this approach consistent or inconsistent with prevailing federal
preemption doctrine, which is often said to entail a “presumption against
preemption”? 70 It depends. If one holds that view that federal safety
regulations tend in general to be only minimally efficient at best, and this
view applies to all federal agencies, then such a presumption may well
make sense. 71 If, however, one believes that at least some agencies some
of the time produce floor-and-ceiling efficient safety standards, then a
presumption against preemption in those situations may not make sense,
unless such a presumption is made easily defeasible by a showing to the
court (presumably made by a defendant) that the regulatory standard in
question is precisely efficient. (This would be the inverse of the
argument regarding the efficiency of the “rebuttable presumptions” in
favor of federal preemption created by a number of state legislatures,
69

That is what should be done with implied preemption cases. What about express
preemption cases? Even with cases involving express statutory preemption provisions,
courts will often have some decision-making discretion when the terms of the
preemption provisions are not entirely clear on the relevant question. In such
situations, courts can, and should, take into account the nature of the regulation in
question and the regulatory process that produced it, as just described. This conclusion,
of course, is limited by the assumptions set out at the beginning of the Article,
including the assumption of rationally informed regulated parties. However, at least in
many of the most high-profile products liability cases, where the regulated parties are
large automakers or pharmaceutical companies, these assumptions seem entirely
plausible.
70
See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (citing Hillsborough
County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715–16 (1985). Note, however,
that the presumption against preemption does not always seem to be honored. See, e.g.,
Geier. Justice Alito in the Levine case has gone so far as to say that there has never
been a presumption against preemption in conflict preemption questions. [See his fn
14.]
71
This conclusion ignores other more traditional federalism-type rationales for the
presumption against preemption. From the desire to satisfy the potentially disparate
regulatory preferences of the citizens of different states, to the hope that deferring to
state and local law would induce democractic participation at the state and local levels,
to a vision of race-to-the-top competition among 50 separate regulatory laboratories,
numerous reasons (that are strictly speaking not deterrence reasons) have been given by
scholars for why federal laws regulating risk should not be interpreted readily to
displace state laws that do the same thing. See generally Nina A. Mendelson, A
Presumption Against Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 695, 709-10 (2008) (reviewing
arguments and citing relevant literature).
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discussed above.) Indeed, depending on how easily the presumption is
rebutted, there may not be much difference between a presumption
against preemption and no presumption at all. The ease with which the
courts (including most famously the U.S. Supreme Court in recent years)
have in fact overcome this presumption has led some scholars to argue
either that there is a presumption in the other direction or that, instead of
a presumption, the courts are simply applying their own substantive
preferences. 72
A recent Supreme Court case dealing with federal preemption of
state tort claims illustrates how this analysis might be applied. Wyeth v.
Levine, 73 decided this term, involved a state law failure-to-warn tort
claim brought against the maker of the anti-nausea drug Phenergan. The
plaintiff was severely injured when the drug was administered to her
through the so-called IV-Push method, whereby the drug is injected
directly into a vein, and during that process some of the drug came into
contact with oxygen-rich arterial blood in the plaintiff’s arm, causing an
interaction that eventually led to gangrene. As a result, the plaintiff’s
arm had to be amputated. At trial the plaintiff claimed, and the jury
ultimately agreed, that if the warning on the drug had been more explicit
about the specific risks of IV-Push administration compared with the
much safer IV-Drip method, the accident would not have happened. The
drug maker argued that the warning did in fact mention the risk of the
IV-Push method and that, in any event, the claim was impliedly
preempted since the specific warning had been approved by the FDA.
The Supreme Court did not buy the defendant’s implied
preemption argument and held instead that presumption against
preemption led to the opposite result. In reaching its conclusion, the
majority included a lengthy discussion of tort law’s history of
supplementing federal regulation of drug labels and warnings.
In keeping with Congress’ decision not to pre-empt common-law
tort suits, it appears that the FDA traditionally regarded state law
as a complementary form of drug regulation. The FDA has
limited resources to monitor the 11,000 drugs on the market, and
72

Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters: A Different Approach to
Preemption, 69 Brook. L. Rev. 1313, 1318–24 (2004); Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the
Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. Rev. 967 (2002); Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 429, 471–72 (2002).
73
Full cite.
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manufacturers have superior access to information about their
drugs, especially in the post-marketing phase as new risks
emerge. State tort suits uncover unknown drug hazards and
provide incentives for drug manufacturers to disclose safety risks
promptly. They also serve a distinct compensatory function that
may motivate injured persons to come forward with information.
Failure-to-warn actions, in particular, lend force to the FDCA’s
premise that manufacturers, not the FDA, bear primary
responsibility for their drug labeling at all times. Thus, the FDA
long maintained that state law offers an additional, and
important, layer of consumer protection that complements FDA
regulation. 74

This statement of the Court’s reasoning sounds very much consistent
with the sort of coordination framework this Article is putting forward:
that federal regulation of drug labels and warnings sets only minimally
efficient standards which, in specific cases, might be optimally
supplemented with additional warnings. And that tort law is supposed to
play the role of inducing manufacturers to do adopt the precisely optimal
warnings that fit the particular situations that arise. Again, this
conclusion is obviously consistent with the coordination framework set
out above. Whether we can say that it is the right conclusion in this
particular case, however, would depend on a close reading of the specific
facts of the case. 75
What about Non-Compliance with Regulatory Standards?
In the cases just discussed, and in most cases involving claims of
federal preemption of state tort claims, the defendants in question have
complied with the federal regulatory standards. What about cases of
74

Id. at __.
The presence of a dissenting opinion in the case suggests, of course, that reasonable
people can disagree on how the case should be resolved. The Levine Dissent’s primary
argument is that the FDA in this case seems to have concluded that the warnings/labels
that were authorized were sufficient to get the job done – in the sense of being both an
efficient floor and an efficient ceiling. To support this conclusion, the Dissent was at
pains to document the amount of time and effort the agency put into approving the
particular warnings that were used in this case; and the opinion observes that the
manufacturer had even suggested a more stringent warning several years back, which
had been rejected by the Agency. The Majority gives a great deal of weight to the trial
court’s finding that that the Agency never gave more than “passing attention” the issue
of IV-Push versus IV-Drip administration of the drug. I provide a fuller discussion of
the details of Levine case and its significance for products liability law elsewhere. See
Kyle D. Logue, Federal Preemption and the Purpose of Tort Law (working paper).
75
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non-compliance? Specifically, what has the Supreme Court said about
federal preemption in situations in which there has been non-compliance
by the tort defendant with federal regulatory standards? Frankly, such
cases rarely reach the Supreme Court, presumably because it is
considered uncontroversial that non-compliance with federal regulatory
standards negates federal preemption. There has certainly been a fair
amount of explicit dicta to that effect. The Court has often stated that
parallel state-based products liability claims should not be preempted, so
long as the state-based duties that are alleged to be violated merely
parallel (and do not add to) federal duties.76 Thus, the Court seems to be
saying that non-compliance with FDA standards should disable any
preemptive effect of the otherwise preemptive regulations and that, if
states want to supplement the federal enforcement of FDA regulations
with parallel state-law enforcement, that is just fine. What’s more,
although none of the Supreme Court cases that discuss the possibility of
such parallel claims mention the doctrine of negligence per se,
presumably that doctrine, in the event of manufacturer’s noncompliance
with FDA requirements, would also not be preempted.
Why, as an efficiency matter, would such parallel common-law
tort claims, whether as negligence per se claims or product defect claims,
be exempt from preemption, given the presence of rigorous FDA
regulation? Again, applying the framework from the previous Part, it
could be that the Court views the agency as being competent at setting
standards but in need of help with regard to enforcing those standards.
(The quote above from Levine certainly has language to that effect.)
Alternatively, it may be that the Court, in deciding the circumstances
under which federal regulations will preempt state tort claims, is
influenced by a corrective justice conception of tort law, or by a sort of
blended corrective justice/regulatory view. There is evidence for both of
these views within the Court’s various tort-preemption opinions. One
lesson of this Article is that the Court needs to decide on a particular
conception of the function of tort law, in part because one’s normative
vision of the function of tort law can have important implications for
how tort law should be harmonized with other forms of regulation.
One area of continuing controversy in the tort-preemption field –
an area that also presents the problem of non-compliant tortfeasors – is
the problem of the manufacturer who seems to be in compliance with
76

Riegel; Lohr.

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2009

41

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 105 [2009]

41

FDA regulations, but who the plaintiff alleges secured FDA approval
through fraud. The Supreme Court has held that tort suits brought
against such defendants alleging “fraud on the FDA” are preempted,
because allowing such suits would interfere with agency’s ability and
discretion to punish such fraud on its own. 77 After all, the argument
goes, the FDA has the power to seek sanctions, including criminal
penalties, for such fraudulent behavior. On the one hand, there is a
strong argument that federal preemption should be disabled (and state
tort claims allowed to proceed) when the parties have lied to secure
regulatory approval.
On the other hand, there is something troubling about the
prospect that any time a manufacturer gets approval from the FDA for a
new drug or medical device, that manufacturer then has to prepare to
defend itself against state tort suits in potentially 50 states arguing that
the FDA’s decision should be annulled due to fraud. 78 Moreover, if
federal criminal penalties for defrauding a federal agency are not enough
to deter such behavior, what additional benefit will there be from statebased tort suits?
Professor Catherine Sharkey has suggested a resolution to this
debate: Allow preemption to be disabled only by a decision of the FDA
(or whoever the relevant agency is) that there was fraud in the
application process. At that point, once the agency has made the fraud
finding, the preemption of state-based tort suits would be “turned off.” 79
This strikes me as a reasonable suggestion. Let the FDA be the judge of
whether or not there has been adequate and untainted compliance with its
(the FDA’s) regulations. Injured victims, or other interested parties,
could of course bring any available evidence of fraud to the agency’s
attention, as they would have an incentive to do. But it would be up to
the agency to make the fraud determination. If we allow any old
common law court hearing a court case to make such a determination,
then the possibility of redundant regulation is obvious.
77

Buckman v. Plaintiff’s Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341 (2001). It remains unclear,
however, whether that case will be construed as requiring preemption only state claims
that specifically sound in “fraud on the agency,” or whether it will be interpreted to
preempt a regular design-defect claim that relies in some way on the fraud of the
defendant.
78
Catherine M. Sharkey, The Fraud Caveat to Agency Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev.
841 (2008).
79
Id. at 841.
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The only qualification I would add to Sharkey’s conclusion is
that if it is the case that the agency in question has the resources to police
fraud in the regulatory process, it may also be the case that the agency
has the ability also to police and punish fraud in that process as well, in
which case preemption may still be appropriate. Perhaps the FDA (or
whatever agency it is) should, in addition to making the initial fraud
determination, determine explicitly whether it wishes to be the sole
enforcer of the rules against fraud in the regulatory process. Of course,
there may be reasons to doubt the agency’s objectivity on this question,
but if that is a concern, we might not want to rely on the agency to make
the fraud determination in the first place.
V. Other Issues of Overlapping Sanctions and Coordination with Torts
Overlapping Social Norms or Customs
The law-and-economics literature on social norms treats nonlegal norms and their accompanying informal sanctions as an alternative
system of regulation. The basic idea is that norms arise more or less
organically from within a particular community, and these norms play a
regulatory role similar to that of legal rules by identifying conduct that is
considered undesirable and imposing informal sanctions on those who
engage in this behavior. 80 Although the precise nature of these informal
sanctions usually is left vague in the literature, the quintessential
example is a loss of reputation within the community, which in turn
reduces the sanctioned party’s wealth or, more generally, her utility.
Ideally, actors over time begin to “internalize” social norms such that the
experience some sort of internal sanction (such as guilt) if they violate

80

As Eric Posner has aptly observed, “[t]he concept of a ‘norm’ is slippery, and
scholars use it in different ways.” Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient
Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1697, 1698 (1996). Although there are numerous different
definition of norms, Posner’s will do will enough for my purposes:
A norm can be understood as a rule that distinguishes desirable and
undesirable behavior and gives a third party the authority to punish a
person who engages in the undesirable behavior. Thus, a norm
constrains attempts by people to satisfy their preferences. I n these
ways, a norm is like a law, except that a private person sanctions the
violator of a norm, whereas a state actor sanctions the violator of a
law.
Id.
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the norm, thus eliminating the need for external enforcement of the
norms by members of the community. 81
Within this literature, it is generally assumed, always implicitly,
that an informal social sanction will not produce an offsetting gain to
anyone else, not even the victim of the norm violation. That is, unlike a
monetary sanction such as a tax or tort damages, social sanctions (loss of
reputation or pangs of guilt) do not increase anyone else’s utility. 82 If
that is true, social sanctions have something important in common with
prison sentences: the disutility experienced by the sanctioned party is a
deadweight loss. 83 As mentioned in Part II, this is the main reason that
fines are generally considered by economists to be superior to nonmonetary penalties, assuming fines are feasible. Of course, norms can
operate where monetary legal sanctions cannot, when there are problems
with insolvent injurers, for example. Also, norms (especially fully
internalized norms) are cheaper to administer than a regime of pure legal
sanctions. Think of all the deterrence/cost-internalization work that is
continuously done by informal norms (external and internally enforced)
in the world with respect to everyday behavior. Now consider how
unimaginably expensive it would be if there were no social norms to do
all of that heavy lifting and if everyone was the quintessential Holmseian
bad man.
Whether a given social norm or custom is efficient (in the
regulatory sense of optimally incentivizing potential injurers), or under
what conditions efficiency should be expected, is a much debated issue.
Some argue that, at least in situations in which the community in
question is close knit and there are no parties outside of the community
who are affected by the communities’ behavior, efficient norms or
81

Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of
Internalized Norms, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1577 (2000).
82
One exception is Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Should Courts Deduct Nonlegal
Sanctions from Damages?, 30 J. Legal Stud. 401 (2001). Cooter and Porat argue that in
informal social sanctions will generally produce what amounts to beneficial
externalities. For example, they argue that whenever a social sanction is imposed on
someone who has violated a norm, the fact of enforcement of the norm reinforces the
norm itself, thus generating a sort of public good. A conclusion they draw from this
argument is that tort damages should be offset to the extent of the non-monetary social
sanctions, similarly to the way that I have argued that strict liability tort damages
should be reduced to offset the existence of ex ante Pigovian taxes. See infra note __
for further discussion of this issue.
83
This conclusion of course ignores any psychic benefit that victims might get, or any
intrinsic retributive value in seeing criminals locked up.
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customs can emerge. 84 In such situations, the evolution of the social
norm has the structure of iterated Prisoner’s-Dilemma game, from which
value maximizing solutions can evolve. Not everyone agrees, however,
that efficient norms will develop even in close-knit groups: for example,
if there are spillover effects outside of the group. 85 In addition, efficient
norms can arise in situations other than iterated in Prisoner’s-Dilemma
game structures. Steven Hetcher has pointed out, for example, that
efficient norms or customs can arise to solve coordination problems,
even without close-knittedness. 86 Consider the norm of drivers in a
particular country all driving on the right-hand side of the road. This
norm prevails not primarily because of the threat of informal reputational
sanctions within the community of drivers, but rather because failing to
follow the norm once it has taken hold can lead to a serious car accident,
an outcome that anyone would want to avoid. 87
So how should tort law interact, or be coordinated, with such
social norms/customs? Before proceeding with the analysis, one caveat
is in order. This Article has assumed that the common law court
deciding a tort case must take all non-tort regulatory regimes as given.
This is an obviously unrealistic perspective. A legislature or agency
might adjust its approach to regulating risky behavior based on what tort
courts do; and if a court truly wants to maximize social welfare, it would
need to take such reactions into account. Still, as a first approximation,
ignoring such interactive effects makes sense, as such legislative/agency
adjustments may well never come. This narrow static perspective is a
little harder to maintain when the alternative system of regulation is
social norms. When a court announces that a given behavior is
negligent, it may increase the social sanction imposed on that conduct as
well, assuming people take their cues on such matters from what courts
say. Alternatively, if a court decides to impose strict liability on a given
activity, the community might regard this as a form of ex post taxation
(as, in effect, charging a price to engage in the behavior in question) and
84

Ellickson, supra note __.
E. Posner, supra.
86
Steven Hetcher, Creating Safe Social Norms in a Dangerous World, 73 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 1, 78 (1999). Indeed, close-knittedness can be a cause of inefficiency, when the
close-knit group becomes insulating from improvements in knowledge in the larger
community. Id.
87
This particular norm has of course now been incorporated into the law. The point is
that even in the absence of legal penalties for driving on the wrong side of the road,
there would be a large sanction for doing so in the form of the risk of injury to one’s
self.
85
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may therefore regard it as a substitute for social sanctions. This sort of
“crowding out” effect has been documented in some experimental
settings. Ideally, then, courts hearing tort cases (or lawmakers designing
tort law) would take such interactive effects into account. To put it
mildly, such an evaluation would be challenging. To avoid complicating
my own analysis beyond what can reasonably be addressed in a single
Article, I will ignore such interactive effects.
Back to the question, then: how best to coordinate tort law with
overlapping social norms/customs. Part of the argument tracks the
analysis from Part III above. If the social-norm/informal-sanction
regime is fully optimizing, no tort law is necessary. If it is only partially
optimizing, then tort law can play a supplemental role. And if tort law is
to play a supplemental role, the nature of that role will depend on the
structure of the norm. Specifically, it will depend on whether the
applicable tort rule is negligence or strict liability and on whether the
norm itself is more like a negligence rule or a strict liability rule. If the
applicable liability rule is negligence, and the norm too is akin to an
informal non-legal negligence standard, a court could then inquire
whether the standard of care enforced under the norm is efficient and if
so whether it is merely minimally efficient or floor-and-ceiling efficient.
If this nonlegal standard is only minimally efficient (and this could be
demonstrated), then it would save administrative costs to apply
something like a negligence per se doctrine, whereby failure to comply
with the custom would be decisive as to negligence.
Likewise if it could be determined that the norm was floor-andceiling efficient (and assuming the social sanction is not fully deterring),
a rule of negligence per se plus a rule of non-negligence per se might be
efficient. In such a situation, non-compliance with the social norm
should be considered decisive as to negligence and compliance with the
social norm should be considered fully exculpatory; in both cases, the
use of the floor-and-ceiling efficient custom would avoid the
administrative costs of having the court do the full-blown negligence
analysis. And again, if it can be demonstrated both that the norm is
floor-and-ceiling efficient and that the norm is fully enforced through
informal sanctions (i.e., that the social norm and informal sanctions are
fully optimizing), then tort law would have no deterrence role. That is, a
court might think of custom as displacing state tort law (or not), in much
the same way that federal regulations sometimes displace or preempt
state tort law.
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Does tort law actually follow this pattern? Not so much. The
way in which tort law tends to coordinate with custom in practice is that,
when there is a relevant custom, compliance and non-compliance are
considered merely relevant, not decisive. 88 Thus, in the existing tort
doctrine, there is nothing equivalent either to negligence per se or what I
have called non-negligence per se, as sometimes exists with regulations.
The framework of this Article would suggest that such doctrines might
be worth adopting, in situations in which it is possible for courts (or for
tort-reformist legislatures) to identify non-legal social norms that are
efficient but that are not already fully enforced through informal
sanctions. Moreover, in situations in which it can be shown that social
norms are fully optimizing, an argument can be made for eliminating tort
liability as a form of regulation altogether, although such a radical move
would obviously have to come from a legislative pronouncement.
The preceding discussion assumed that applicable social norm
was structured like a negligence rule, that the norm called for an
informal non-monetary (e.g., reputational) sanction only if the injurer
failed to take something approximating due care. But what if norms do
not work that way? What if social norms are less precise than that and
instead of making fine-grained determinations of whether the party who
caused the injury could have efficiently prevented it, the norms simply
call for some sort of sanction on whoever causes an injury? That is,
what if norms act more like strict liability rules?
First, a strict liability social norm would have implications for a
tort regime that applied a negligence standard, implications that that are
very different from those associated with the existence of an overlapping
monetary sanction such as a Pigovian tax. 89 If a potential injurer can
expect to incur a SL non-monetary sanction for causing a given harm to
some third party, then the negligence standard itself governing that
conduct (not the damage award) would need to be adjusted upward to
take account of this additional social cost. That is to say, the standard of
care would need to be raised to account for the fact that the activity in

88

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm § 13. There are some cases
that diverge from this general rule. Specifically, in some cases, divergence from
custom is considered presumptive negligence, a conclusion that turns out to be difficult
for the defendant to rebut. Id.
89
See the discussion below.
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question not only poses a risk of harm to some third party victim, but
also that it poses a risk of harm to the potential injurer herself.
This point is almost identical to an argument made by Robert
Cooter and Ariel Porat concerning how the negligence standard,
embodied in the Hand Rule, should be adjusted to account for the risk of
harm to the potential injurer. 90 The point is fairly simple, albeit
somewhat counterintuitive. Take the example again of an activity that
has a 1 in 1000 chance of causing a $100,000 harm to some third-party
victim, but imagine that it is a risk that can be completely eliminated for
a given expenditure of care on the part of the potential injurer. The
question now is how much of an investment in risk reduction does
efficiency require?
Put differently, given these numbers, what
constitutes the optimal level of care? The answer would depend on a
number of factors, but given these numbers the maximum efficient
amount of care on the part of the potential injurer is $100. Any
expenditure greater than that, even if it eliminated the risk of harm to the
third parties, would not be cost-justified. Now add the assumption that,
in the event of the accident, not only will the third-party victim be
harmed, but the injurer herself will suffer a harm of $25,000. Because
this harm to the injurer is a social cost as well, it should be taken into
account, if what we care about is overall cost minimization, which means
that the maximum level of due care should now be higher – in this
example, $125. 91
What Cooter and Porat did not point out, however, is that, insofar
as there are strict liability nonmonetary sanctions for a given third-party
harm (such as the sort of non-monetary reputational sanctions that often
occur when norms are enforced), such sanctions would have essentially
the same effect on the calculation of the optimal negligence standard as
do “harms to self.” Again, this is because non-monetary sanctions,
90

Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Does Harm to Self Increase the Care Owed to Others?
Law and Economics in Conflict, 29 J. Legal Stud. 19 (2001).
91
Cooter and Porat therefore suggested that American tort law should be reformed to
incorporate this insight. Cooter & Porat, supra note __, at 25 (“By ignoring the effect
of injurer’s precaution on self-risk, American common law systematically fails to
analyze accurately the problem of joint risk.”). Interestingly, the Third Restatement
seems to adopt Cooter & Porat’s view on this question and even cites their article.
Restatement, Draft 1, § 3 cmt. b (“In many situations the conduct of the actor imperils
both the actor and third parties. In such situations, all the risks foreseeably resulting
from the actor’s conduct are considered in ascertaining whether the actor has exercised
reasonable care.”)

http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art105

48

Logue:

48

which cause disutility to the injurers and not necessarily offsetting gain
to the victim, are costs that have to be taken into account in the
efficiency analysis. Thus, if the $25,000 in the example above were a
loss of reputation experienced by the injurer, then the maximal due care
standard would rise, as in the previous example. But to whatever extent
there are nonmonetary sanctions – whether they are external social
sanctions (reputational) or even internal ones (such as guilt) – that are
imposed in a sort of strict liability way (that is, automatically upon the
causing of a third-party harm, with little, or at least not full, mitigation
for lack of fault on the part of the injurer), such sanctions are obviously
analogous to physical or emotional harm to oneself; and the same
Cooter/Porat type of harm-to-self sort of analysis would apply. 92
It seems highly likely that some norms do in fact sometimes take
the form of a strict liability rule, if for no other reason than the problem
of information costs. Such costs render a highly accurate version of the
fault-based alternative impossible. For example, those who cause harm
to others in ways that become very public often suffer an instant
reputational cost that is probably not eliminated, or even much
diminished, by the fact that the injurer perhaps could not have costjustifiably avoided the harm. If you accidentally hit a pedestrian with
92

There are a number of possible explanations for why Cooter and Porat might have
left this point out of their analysis. First, perhaps they were simply not thinking about
nonlegal sanctions, maybe because their view is that such sanctions are too difficult to
quantify in the first place. However, in another article written around the same time as
the Harm to Self peace, Cooter and Porat wrote explicitly about the question whether
tort damages should be offset to account for nonlegal sanctions; so they certainly had
nonlegal sanctions on their minds at the time, and in that piece they seem to be of the
view that the value of such sanctions could be quantified. See Cooter & Porat, supra
note __. Second, maybe the Cooter and Porat have in mind that social norms tend to
take the form of a negligence rule rather than a strict liability rule, in which case the
analysis would be very different. As discussed in the text, the negligence standard need
not be adjusted if the non-monetary social sanction will be imposed only in the absence
of reasonable care; the point is that any excess sanction will just further encourage due
care, except of course to the extent there is uncertainty in the application of these rules.
As discussed more below, this explanation seems consistent with the assumptions
underlying Cooter and Porat’s Nonlegal Sanctions article, which does seem to assume a
negligence standard is being applied. Finally, it may be that they omitted nonlegal
sanctions from their Harm to Self analysis because they view nonlegal sanctions as
producing beneficial externalities of one sort or another, which makes them more like
monetary sanctions in the sense that they represent, in effect, a transfer and not a social
cost. And indeed this assumption is consistent with assumptions made in their
Nonlegal Sanctions paper. Id. For further elaboration of the implications of the
difference between monetary and non-monetary sanctions, see Logue, supra note __.

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2009

49

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 105 [2009]

49

your car in such a way as to kill them or cause them serious bodily
injury, you almost certainly would experience sever guilt and remorse
and personal anguish, as well as perhaps some loss of reputation in the
community, even if the accident were not your fault in the strictest sense,
that is, even if there was no cost-justifiable step you could have taken to
prevent the accident. Of course, the guilt and anguish and reputational
hit would be considerably larger if the crash were the result of your
recklessness or, worse still, your intentional wrongdoing. But even if it
were the result of pure bad luck, there would be some residual
nonmonetary cost associated with causing severe harm to others. And
to that extent, the nonmonetary sanction, internal or external, would have
an element of strict liability, of harm to self. 93
Overlapping Criminal Sanctions
What if the non-tort regulatory regime in place, instead being
agency-based command-and-control regulation or informal social norms,
is the criminal law? That is, if we envision the criminal law itself as a
tool of risk regulation that tort law must take as fixed, how should tort
law be adjusted to coordinate with the existence of potential criminal
sanctions for the same activities to which tort law sanctions often apply?
The section briefly addresses that question.
First of all, we should not that most criminal standards fit the
mold of what this Article’s framework would call an efficient minimum,
in the sense that criminal laws envision a standard of conduct that
everyone is expected to comply with. Put in the standard language of
deterrence, the criminal law prohibits activity whose net social value for
whatever reason is deemed to be zero. For example, if we think of
crimes that easily fall within the category of intentional harms, it is easy
to see that, but for a narrow set of exceptional cases, it would generally
be welfare-maximizing for everyone to refrain from violating the
standard. 94 Thus, the law should seek, as cheaply as possible, to deter all
93

Although this is not a question that has been analyzed thoroughly or tested
empirically, my intuition seems to be shared by others. See, e.g., Richard Posner,
Economic Analysis of Law 270 (2007) ("So the law penalizes murder, but not rudeness,
and negligent injuries but not (in general) injuries that are the result of a pure accident
even though people feel guilt when they inflict even an unavoidable injury--showing
there is a norm, though not in general a law, of strict liability for inflicting injury.").
94
When transaction costs are high (such that the potential injurer is faced with an
emergency situation and most decide whether to harm someone else’s property or be
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intentionally caused harms (so long as they do not fall within one of the
categories of exceptions).
What the framework of this Article suggests that tort law should
do in such situations is this: If the criminal law’s minimally efficient
standard is not fully enforced, in the sense that it does not induce all
parties to comply with this minimal standard of care, then tort law can
supplement the sanction with a sanction of its own. In that case,
efficiency would call for tort liability in all cases of intentional harm,
perhaps with a threat of punitive damages just to emphasize the point:
everyone must comply with the minimal standard of not intentionally
harming others. If, however, the criminal law itself already fully deters
non-compliance with this minimal standard of care, then tort law need
not supplement the sanction; and the appropriate coordination rule would
be: no tort liability for intentionally caused harms. 95
Does the law coordinating tort liability with criminal sanctions
line up with these recommendations? It’s hard to say. It depends on
one’s view of whether existing criminal sanctions are ever fully
deterring, in the sense of ever providing optimal ex ante incentives to
comply. But for the exceptions already mentioned, tort law always
permits injured victims to recover for intentionally caused harm; and this
is true even (or perhaps the better word is especially) in those subset of
cases in which the intentional harm would also qualify as criminal and
thus subject the injurer to criminal penalties. Indeed, if there is a
criminal conviction for the act in question, that conviction will often be
decisive on the question of intent to cause harm and on the question of
causation. Moreover, not only does the common law of torts allow
injured victims to recover damages for intentional harms, it usually
allows them to recover punitive damages as well. If one holds the view
that the functions of criminal law and tor law are purely regulatory, and
that the goal of both should be to minimize the costs of harm (including
the costs of preventing harm as well as administrative costs), do these
results make sense?
To state the obvious, if it is the case that criminal law is already
fully deterring of intentionally caused harms, then tort law as a system of
harmed himself), the law sometimes allows exceptions, using such term as “necessity”
or “self defense.” Or so goes the standard L&E story.
95
This latter conclusion is analogous to the situation discussed in Part II above where
the ex ante agency regulation fully enforces the $5 minimally efficient standard of care.
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deterrence/cost-internalization is redundant and wasteful. Unless it can
be shown that criminal sanctions are never (ever) fully deterring for any
activity under any circumstances, it would seem from the economic
perspective that tort law is never (or almost never) preempted by the
existence of overlapping criminal sanctions.
There are a number of obvious responses to this conclusion.
First, it might be argued that criminal sanctions are indeed never fully
deterring and thus that tort law is always needed as a supplementary
sanction. This claim is probably true in many settings, where the
criminal sanction is woefully under-enforced because of budget
constraints or political considerations. But it is difficult to believe that it
is always true in every context in which criminal sanctions apply. For
some criminal offenses, it seems likely that even a remote possibility of
jail time would likely serve as more than sufficient deterrent. 96 Second,
one might instead argue that criminal law cannot be fully deterring
because criminals, or parties considering criminal activity, do not act
rationally. They simply to do not, in their ex ante decision making, take
into account the prospect of criminal punishment after the fact. Whether
or not this is true, it would be just as valid a critique of tort law as a
regulatory mechanism and thus does not provide a good explanation for
why tort sanctions generally should apply alongside criminal sanctions.
Third, one might argue that imposing an overlapping criminal sanction
will not produce over-deterrence, because it really is not possible to
over-deter criminal conduct. That is, criminal behavior is the sort of
behavior that society has decided should be prohibited altogether. And
imposing tort liability for harm caused as a result of a banned activity
would simply reinforce the ban; and actors who want to avoid the double
sanctions need merely honor obey the law. This is true enough;
however, there is still the problem of unnecessary administrative
expenses. Whenever criminal law is thought to be fully deterring of a
given type of misbehavior, it does not make sense for society to incur the
expenses to duplicate the effect via tort law.

96

It is important to remember, of course, that the fact that a crime happens does not
mean that there are not already in place optimal deterrents against such crime. Unless
we are willing to devote infinite resources to policing crime, even an optimal criminal
sanction will not prevent all crime. This analogous to the point made earlier about
optimal regulation and tort law: accidents will happen, even in a world of optimal
regulation.
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The most powerful argument against the redundancy of tort law
in cases of overlapping criminal sanctions contends that neither tort law
nor criminal law is about deterrence or cost-internalization, or that one is
but not the other. Rather, tort law, the argument might go, is about
corrective justice, and criminal law is about something else – perhaps
retribution. Or maybe tort law is about both deterrence and criminal law
is about retribution – or some other permutation of those options. The
point is that the two regimes – tort and criminal law – have two different
functions that can be fulfilled simultaneously when criminally caused
harms are allowed to give rise to both criminal sanctions (including
possibly prison time) and private tort damages. On this view, it is no
accident that tort claims are available for criminally (intentionally)
caused harms; corrective justice and retributive justice tend to go
together and cut in the same direction, though without being the least
redundant. This argument is internally consistent and in some ways
difficult to refute. Even if one thinks criminal law is entirely and
exclusively about retribution, however, if one does hold the view that
tort law is, at least in part, about deterrence/cost internalization, and if
there are ever situations in which criminal law is fully deterring of
certain types of breaches of minimally efficient standards of behavior,
there is at least a tension created – a potential tradeoff between efficiency
(and the avoidance of excessive administrative costs) and this goal of
retribution or whatever else it might be. 97 Of course, insofar as a
criminal conviction resolves all of the difficult factual questions
presented in a tort case (of causation and fault, for example), then
securing an overlapping tort judgment – which would in most cases be
reached via summary judgment – would be relatively cheap in terms of
administrative costs, even if redundant.
Pigovian Taxes, Strict Liability, and Activity Levels
The analysis in the preceding Parts addressed the problem of how
to coordinate tort law (specifically negligence-based tort claims) with
some overlapping non-tort system of regulation – specifically, agencybased command-and-control regulation or social norms or the criminal
law. In this Part, I consider a few other combinations. First, reconsider
the possibility of ex ante Pigovian taxes as well as tort law’s ex post
97

One way in which the tort system does coordinate with the criminal system in a
manner that is consistent with framework of this article is that, insofar as the criminal
system requires injurers to pay restitution to their victims, such payments must be
deducted from tort damages.
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equivalent, by which I mean a rule of strict (or more accurately, absolute
enterprise) liability. As discussed in Part II, there are certain advantages
and disadvantages associated with both of these regulatory tools. One
advantage that they have in common is that, if done properly, both have
the potential not only to optimize potential injurers’ care levels (as
negligence and command-and-control regulation have the potential to
do), but they can optimize activity levels as well, which even a perfectly
functioning negligence or command-and-control regime will not.
To illustrate, use the example from above but this time imagine
that the only available care-level investment is a $25 enhancement that
lowers risk from $100 to $20 – an $80 improvement. (Say that the carelevel investment either reduces the probability of the $100,000 harm
from .001 to .0002, or it reduces the likely harm itself from 100k to 20k).
Still, this care-level investment leaves a residual (unavoidable) risk of
$20. In that case, if there were a command-and-control regulation in
force that required potential injurers to make the efficient $25 care-level
investment, and if that were the only regulation in effect, the potential
injurers would tend to over-invest in this activity, as the $20 residual risk
would be externalized to third parties. That is, the potential injurers may
engage in the activity even though the benefit to them is only, say, $15,
because of the $20 residual-risk externality.
In such a situation, tort law would provide no useful costinternalization/deterrence, assuming that negligence standard was the
applicable liability rule. This is because, if the regulated party were to
comply with the command-and-control regulatory standard, she would
also avoid a negligence claim and thus continue to externalize the $20
residual risk. If, however, the tort rule were strict liability instead, then
the externality would be internalized and there would be no
overinvestment in the activity. There would only be investment in the
activity up to the point at which the marginal social cost equals the
marginal social benefit. Notice also that the existence of the ex ante
command-and-control care-level standard would not change the way in
which strict liability should be implemented: the court would still
simply hold the injurer liable ex post for the actual harm caused, whether
that harm turned out to be $100,000 or $20,000. As explained, with
strict liability, optimality is achieved simply by setting damages equal to
harm.
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Now imagine how things would change if, in place of the
command-and-control ex ante regulatory requirement, there was a
Pigovian tax. How should tort law coordinate with such a non-tort
regulatory regime? A Pigovian tax, recall, is capable of optimizing both
potential injurer care levels (assuming the potential injurer knows what
care-level investments to make and that the Pigovian tax is adjusted
downward as the regulated party makes those investments) and activity
levels (because of simple cost-internalization principles). As a result, if
there were a fully optimizing (perfectly adjusting) Pigovian tax, then
here again there would be no role for tort law as regulation. So, in the
recurring example, if there were a Pigovian tax of $100, tort law should
be fully preempted/displaced. Tort liability of any sort would generate
useless administrative costs and, in the case of strict liability (unlike in
the case of negligence), redundant sanctions. This result, so far as I
know, has not been addressed in the federal preemption jurisprudence (or
literature). That is, no case has held, nor even suggested in dicta (and no
scholar has argued), that the existence of a fully cost-internalizing
federal Pigovian tax should be interpreted (under the Supremacy Clause)
to preempt state taxes or state tort law that has the effect of a tax (such as
strict products liability). 98
If, however, the Pigovian tax were only partially costinternalizing, tort law could then provide an efficient supplementary
sanction. If the Pigovian tax, for example, were for some reason set at,
say, $20 ($80 less than the optimal amount), then the optimal tort
liability system would use strict liability to impose tort damages of only
$80,000 – having an expected value of $80. Thus, the presence of a
Pigovian tax would inevitably require an adjustment to tort damages
under a strict liability tort regime in order to optimize deterrence.
Note also that if there were Pigovian tax in place and the
prevailing tort liability rule were negligence, there is some possibility of
deterrence redundancy if the tax is not perfectly adjusting – specifically,
if the Pigovian tax were not adjusted to take into account the potential
injurer’s likely adjustment to the threat of tort liability. So, in our
98

The reasons, of course, that the case law and the commentators have ignored such
potential conflicts between federal and state regulatory law are both that there are no
real federal Pigovian taxes per se and, even if there were, federal preemption doctrine is
generally not applied to taxes. That is, even if the federal government imposes a tax on
a particular transaction or product, states likely would still allowed to tax or otherwise
regulate that transaction or product without raising any Supremacy Clause concerns.
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example, imagine that the negligence rule induced potential injurers to
make the efficient $25 care-level investment.
If the regulator
nevertheless set the Pigovian tax at $100 (the pre-deterrence level of
expected external harm), there would obviously be excessive deterrence;
and potential injurers would engage in too little of the regulated activity.
In such a case, the regulator should set the Pigovian tax at $20, which
would account for the reduction in expected external harm induced by
the negligence rule. The same point, of course, could be made about
overlapping Pigovian taxes and command-and-control regulations: the
former should be adjusted to take account of the latter. 99
Current tort doctrine does not reflect any of these considerations.
That result, however, could be simply because of the absence of any real
Pigovian taxes and the predominance of negligence doctrine over strict
liability at the state level. Although there are so-called sin taxes (e.g.,
taxes on alcohol and tobacco sales) in the United States, both at the state
and federal levels, there seems to be little effort to link those taxes to the
amount of negative externalities associated with those activities. The
same is true of gasoline taxes. In general, the federal government and
the governments of the various states have made little use of taxes
designed explicitly and precisely to be cost-internalizing. Of course, a
tax need not necessarily be labeled “cost-internalizing” or “Pigovian” to
have that effect; and it is certainly true that some of the various
individual taxes on various activities could be considered roughly and
partially cost-internalizing. And perhaps the reason tort law ignores
those taxes is that the prevailing standard in most tort cases, and in cases
involving activities likely to be subject to any sort of even roughly costinternalizing tax, is negligence. As suggested above, so long as those
quasi-Pigovian taxes are not thought to be fully optimizing (which would
suggest that tort law should play not deterrent role), there is no need for
negligence law to make an adjustment. Negligence law can induce
optimal care levels; and the quasi-Pigovian taxes can help with activity
levels. 100
99

Of course, if there is some possibility of error in the negligence determination, and
there is a Pigovian tax, it may be efficient for the court to adjust the tort damages
downwards. But this would true even if there were no ex post Pigovian tax. That is,
when there is a negligence standard in tort and that standard is uncertain in application,
there can be over-deterrence, as potential injurers will be willing to take some degree of
excessive care to be sure of getting being found non-negligent. See Calfee & Craswell,
supra note __.
100
As mentioned above in the text, Pigovian taxes need to be adjusted to account for the
care-level effects of a negligence rule or of command-and-control regulations.
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VI. Conclusion
The traditional normative economic analysis of tort law has
worked out in impressive detail the characteristics of an optimal tort
regime. Thus, the theoretical circumstances under a liability rule of
negligence would be superior, as a matter of efficienct deterrence, than a
rule of strict liability, and the circumstances under which the reverse
would be true, are well known and are considered a part of the L&E
canon. 101
What has been lacking is a study of how the
deterrence/regulatory function of tort law should be affected by the prior
existence of non-tort systems of regulation that applies to the same
conduct in question. The question could be put this way: If a tort court
is supposed to be implementing a combination of liability rules and
damage awards that gives potential injurers optimal – not too little, not
too much, but Goldilocks optimal – ex ante incentives to minimize the
external harms caused by their activities, then should not tort law
somehow coordinate with already existing non-tort regulatory regimes
that may already, at least to some extent, have dealt with the externality
in question? Should not tort law be coordinated with other systems of
regulation, so as to avoid redundancy of deterrence as well as
unnecessary administrative costs?
This Article explores what such coordination might look like in
situations in which the non-tort system of regulation is either agencybased command-and-control requirements or Pigovians taxes, informal
social norms, or even criminal law. And under a strict set of
assumptions, a fairly straightforward set of prescriptions emerges.
Whatever taxes currently exist that might be thought to approximate a Pigovian tax
certainly do not make such adjustments. Again, if strict liability were the prevailing
tort doctrine and there were real or quasi-Pigovian taxes, then adjustments to tort
damages might be appropriate, and of course such adjustments were require legislative
approval. Indeed, the argument has been made that taxes on tobacco use are so high
that tort liability is not needed at all to internalize those costs and that for this reason,
among others, tobacco companies should not be held liable in tort for the harms their
products cause. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Cigarette Taxation and the Social
Consequences of Smoking, in Tax Policy and the Economy 51, 69 (James M. Porterba
ed., 1995). This argument ignores the fact that existing tobacco taxes make no
adjustments for improvements in care levels and thus give no incentives to try to make
less dangerous cigarettes.
101
See sources cited supra.
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Specifically, if we assume perfect rationality on the part of not only the
regulated parties but also regulating parties (including courts), if we
assume that the sole purpose of tort law is regulation of ex ante
incentives, and, finally, if we assume that existing non-tort systems of
regulation are a fixed part of the landscape, then the framework set out in
this Article would makes some normative sense. This conclusion has
implications not only for how the negligence per se and regulatory
compliance doctrines in tort should be applied by common law courts,
but also for when courts should find state tort causes of action preempted
by federal safety standards.
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